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THROW AWAY THE KEY OR THROW AWAY THE

JAIL? The Effect of Punishment on

Recidivism and Social Cost
Miguel F. P. de Figueiredo*
ABSTRACT

We jail too many people and it costs too much. Incarcerationis not only
expensive, it also is prone to "hardening" and negativepeer learning effects
that may increase recidivism. With local, state, and federal budgets at a
breaking point, politicians and regulators are increasingly considering
alternativeapproaches to preventingcrime. Yet, theyface a problem. Studies
show that incapacitation is a successful way of reducing crime, yet most
scholars and policymakers think that the only way to incapacitate is to
incarcerate. This study demonstrates that this assumption is problematic,
arguing that we should understandincapacitationalong a continuum, with
incarcerationat one end. This understandingis importantbecause it allows
policy makers to think about new ways to avoid the significant social and
fiscal costs of jail while at the same time reaping some of the benefits of
incapacitation.
This article explores the relationship between incapacitation and
incarcerationin the context of drunk driving. Policy makers have adopted a
variety of incarcerationalternatives to curb drunk driving, and this creates
a kind of naturalexperiment that allowsfor the rigorous testing of the effects
of sanctions on future behavior and that derives policy implications for
regulating crimes of addiction. This article is the first to examine the
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effectiveness of the sanctions in curbingrecidivism and vehicle crashes with
some 200,000 alcohol tests.
Four key results emerge from the study. First, it demonstrates that noncarceral sanctions can be effective. Second, the primary channel through
which drunk driving sanctions are effective in reducing recidivism and
crashes is incapacitation, rather than specific deterrence. Third, noncarceralsanctionshave variedsuccess basedon whatform they take andwho
they target. A law passed mandating victim panels, increasingthe length of
license suspensions, and stimulating the use of ignition interlock devices
(JIDs)-whichrequire the driver of a vehicle to take an alcohol test-reduced
crashes during and after suspension of a driver's license. The same law
decreased recidivism during the suspension period, but these recidivismreducing effects ended soon after the license suspension did. In addition, a
license suspension enhancement targeting those with higher blood alcohol
content levels neither reducedrecidivism nor crashes.Fourth, theprobability
of recidivism and subsequent crashesforfirst-time offenders given at least 6
to 24 hours of jail,fines, and a license suspension had no statistically
significant effect relative to those who had no sanctions. This suggests that
drunk drivingsanctions at the legal limit are ineffective. This articleexplains
these results, discusses theoreticaland legal reform implications, and also
outlines a trajectoryfor improving causal inference in the study of criminal
law. This article concludes by discussing the promise and limitations of
generalizingfrom the results to other domains of crime and law.
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INTRODUCTION

For the first time in nearly four decades, there is a slow retrenchment of
policies that created the prison boom. Although the prison population more
than tripled from 220 per 100,000 in the population in 1980 to 732 in 2010,'

the number of inmates in custody has declined every year since 2010.2 The
U.S. Supreme Court laid some of the groundwork for this decline through

several rulings that gave judges greater autonomy with respect to sentencing,
and ordering the release of inmates in response to prison overcrowding.3 Most
4 the Court
notably, in Brown v. Plata,
compelled prison authorities in
California to reduce its prison population by some 40,000 inmates in two

years, as a result of what the majority viewed as inhumane conditions from
prison overcrowding.
Recent public opinion shifts, along with changes at the state and local
level, have also contributed to a slow backlash against mass incarceration.
Prison spending now exceeds expenditures on education and public health,
1.
LAUREN E. GLAZE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN
THE UNITED STATES, 2010 8 app. tbl.3 (2011); JOHN SCHMITT ET AL., CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY
RESEARCH, THE HIGH BUDGETARY COST OF INCARCERATION 13 app. tbl.l (2010). The data for
1980 relies on Bureau of Justice Statistics prisoner andjail inmate custody totals, while population
data is taken from the 1980 U.S. Census. The 2010 data includes the total number in custody held
in state or federal prisons, or in local jails, as of December 31, per 100,000 U.S. residents as of
January 1 of the following year.
2.

E. ANN CARSON & DANIELA GOLINELLI, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN

2012-ADVANCE COUNTS 1 (2013); see also Erica Goode, U.S. Prison Populations Decline,
Reflecting New Approach to Crime, N.Y. TIMES,
July 26, 2013, at All,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/26/us/us-prison-populations-decline-reflecting-newapproach-to-crime.htmi; Press Release, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Prison Population
Declined
for
Third
Consecutive
Year
During
2012
(July
25,
2013),
http://www.bj s.gov/content/pub/press/p 12acpr.cfm.
3.
In 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court gave judges greater discretion to depart from
mandatory minimums in U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005), a landmark case that made the
Federal Sentence Guidelines advisory. The Court ruled that the Sixth Amendment trial by jury
guarantee was inconsistent with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines being mandatory. Id Prior to
Booker, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were mandatory for all federal judges to follow, but
in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 518, 523 (2000) and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S.
296, 308 (2004), the Court also limited the force of the mandatory sentencing guidelines based
on Sixth Amendment issues. Two years later, in Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 10711 (2007), the Court determined that there was no rational basis for the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines to have a 100-to-1 sentencing disparity ratio when an individual possesses, sells, or
traffics crack versus cocaine. Two other decisions worth noting are Gall v. United States, 552
U.S. 38, 59 (2007), and Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 357-58 (2007), both of which
reaffirmed the importance of the sentencing guidelines in playing a role in sentencing decisions.
See generally Jelani Jefferson Exum, The MQre Things Change: A Psychological Case Against
Allowing the FederalSentencing Guidelines to Stay the Same in Light of Gall, Kimbrough, and
New Understandingsof ReasonablenessReview, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 115 (2008).
4.
131 S.Ct. 1910, 1944-47 (2011).
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concerning politicians.' State budget cuts (especially after the 2008 financial
crisis), public opinion shifts amid lower crime rates, 6 the growth of alternative
courts,7 and legislative reforms of sentencing 8 have come together to create a
moment where reform might be possible. In light of these events,
policymakers more than ever before are seeking alternatives in the wake of a
historically polarized policy debate that often pits those emphasizing the need
for greater public safety against those who stress fiscal and humanitarian
concerns. 9 How can the state control crime effectively without further
restraining budgets and worsening prison conditions?
5.
See, e.g., Allegra M. McLeod, ConfrontingCriminalLaw's Violence: The Possibilities
of UnfinishedAlternatives, 8 UNBOUND: HARV. J. LEGAL LEFT 109, 111-12 (2012-2013) (citing
SCHMITT ET AL., supra note 1) ("[S]pending on prisons outpaces investments in education, early
childhood programs, and public health; and family ties are routinely ruptured by criminal law's
intervention in ways that contribute to inter-generational cycles of poverty, underemployment,
and disadvantage").
6.
See, e.g., THE MELLMAN GRP. & PUB. OP. STRATEGIES, PUBLIC OPINION ON SENTENCING
AND
CORRECTIONS
POLICY
IN
AMERICA
1
(2012),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2012/03/30/pew nationalsurveyresearchpaper final.p
df ("1. American voters believe too many people are in prison and the nation spends too much on
imprisonment. 2. Voters overwhelmingly support a variety of policy changes that shift nonviolent offenders from prison to more effective, less expensive alternatives. 3. Support for
sentencing and corrections reforms (including reduced prison terms) is strong across political
parties, regions, age, gender, and racial/ethnic groups."); Robert Weisberg & Joan Petersilia, The
DangersofPyrrhic Victories Against Mass Incarceration,DaEDALUS, Summer 2010, at 124, 125,
126 (stating that the public "has exhibited some softening of attitude toward those perceived as
nonviolent drug offenders," and that "[p]olling suggests that the public is at least slightly less
passionately in favor of prison and long sentences as the solution to the crime problem, especially
because we now have less of a crime problem.").
7.
See, e.g., Allegra M. McLeod, Decarceration Courts: Possibilities and Perils of a
Shifting CriminalLaw, 100 GEO. L.J. 1587, 1649 (2012).
8.
See, e.g., JUDITH GREENE & MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, DOWNSCALING
PRISONS: LESSONS FROM FOUR STATES 3 (2010); David Cole, Turning the Corner on Mass
Incarceration?,9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 27, 29-31 (2011); Goode, supra note 2; Louis Michael
Seidman, Hyper-Incarcerationand Strategies of Disruption:Is There a Way Out?, 9 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 109, 129 (2011); Weisberg & Petersilia, supra note 6, at 124.
9.
See Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, More Prisoners Versus More Crime is the Wrong
Question, 185 BROOKINGS POLICY BRIEF 1 (2011) ("[F]raming the incarceration debate as a
tradeoff between public safety and public finance is far too narrow.... Crime could actually be
reduced if the savings were put to use in strengthening other criminal justice programs and
implementing other reforms."); Goode, supra note 2 (quoting Adam Gelb, director of the Pew
Charitable Trusts' Public Safety Performance Project: "Policy makers are not holding their noses
and saying we have to scale back prisons to save money. The states that are showing drops are
states that are thinking about how they can apply research-based alternatives that work better and
cost less."). The Brown decision is characteristic of this polarized debate. Brown, 131 S.Ct. at
1923-25. The majority opinion, written by Justice Kennedy, highlighted unconstitutional
conditions, including prison overcrowding and inadequate medical care. Id. at 1928. In the
dissent, Justice Alito stated that the Court was gambling with the safety of the people of
California. Id. at 1961. In a recent decision on an order in the case, Justice Scalia called the order
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Non-carceral sanctions10 have the potential to reduce prison overcrowding,
decrease recidivism, and lower corrections costs. Despite these advantages,
some states have been slow to adopt them, in part because their effects are
not well documented or understood. In addition, politicians and interest
groups advocating "tough on crime" policies favoring increased punishment
severity have curried favor with the electorate. Incarceration alternatives also
often lack a strong "expressive function"''-a clear expression of societal
disgust and condemnation-relative to incarceration, creating additional
barriers for their adoption. As a result, rigorous evaluation of the
effectiveness of non-carceral sanctions has largely been overlooked in the
extant literature.1 2 Consequently, use of non-carceral sanctions by
policymakers and judges has frequently been ad hoc, ex-post, and nonevidence-based, often resulting in ineffective targeting of the sanctions
among groups of offenders, and across crimes.13
a "terrible injunction" that would undermine public safety. Brown v. Plata, 134 S. Ct. 1, 2 (2013)
(Scalia, J., dissenting from an order denying a request for a stay). The public safety issue is also
raised in Coleman v. Brown, 952 F. Supp. 2d 901, 907-09 (E.D. Cal. 2013), part of a number of
cases against the State of California for prison conditions that went unaddressed until Brown. In
Coleman, the Eastern District of California, in considering increasing early release of prisoners,
examined how the prison population could be reduced "without a significant adverse effect on
public safety or the criminal justice system's operation." Id. at 907.
10. These sanctions are also called intermediate sanctions, incarceration alternatives, and
alternative sanctions. They include, but are not limited to, community, service, electronic
monitoring, intensive supervision, sex offender registration, and other protective orders, curfews,
fines, "boot camps," and license suspensions.
11. See Dan M. Kahan, Punishment Incommensurability, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 691, 695
(1998); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV 591, 601 (1996).
12. See, e.g., Joan Petersilia et al., Introduction:The Emergence ofIntermediate Sanctions,
in SMART SENTENCING: THE EMERGENCE OF INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS ix, x (James M. Byrne et
al. eds., 1992) ("Program descriptions and evaluations [of intermediate sanctions] are scarce and
not
well
publicized.");
Incarceration,
UNIV.
CHI.
CRIME
LAB,
http://crimelab.uchicago.edu/page/incarceration (last visited Dec. 18, 2015) ("Intermediate
sanctions, such as fines or community service requirements, provide another alternative to
incarceration, although the evaluation evidence in this area is relatively limited.").
13. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has largely praised the U.S. Sentencing Commission
for its data-driven approach to sentencing, in Kimbrough v. UnitedStates, 552 U.S. 85, 96 (2007),
the majority used the crack-powder disparity as an example where the Commission "did not use
[an] empirical approach in developing the Guidelines sentences." Some rigorous program
evaluation efforts of non-carceral sanctions do exist, from which reliable causal inferences about
the effects of the sanctions can be made. See, e.g., Joan Petersilia et al., Intensive Supervision
Programsfor Drug Offenders, in SMART SENTENCING: THE EMERGENCE OF INTERMEDIATE
SANCTIONS, supra note 12, at 18, 20; J.J. Prescott & Jonah E. Rockoff, Do Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Laws Affect Criminal Behavior?, 54 J.L. & ECON. 161, 163-65
(2011). However, the larger trend has been neglect of the rigorous evaluation of incarceration
alternatives. See, e.g., Joan Petersilia, A Decade of Experimenting with Intermediate Sanctions:
What Have We Learned?, in 2 NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, PERSPECTIVES ON CRIME AND JUSTICE 79,
84-85 (1998) (discussing the problems with previous studies and low participation in alternative
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This article begins to fill this important gap. The study reported here is the
first to take advantage of a quasi-experiment in Arkansas with the case of
drunk driving, an offense that imposes high costs on society, and where the
state relies on a variety of non-carceral sanctions. Over the last decade, drunk
driving has resulted in 10,000 to 20,000 traffic fatalities nationally per year. 4
One in three people in the United States knows someone who has been in an
accident involving a drunk driver, and nearly forty percent of all traffic deaths
are related to drunk driving. A study in 2002 estimated the cost to taxpayers
and federal and local governments at $51 billion per year, excluding deaths
and injuries. 5 The cost is undoubtedly higher today.
To examine whether sanctions are mitigating the costs imposed by drunk
driving, this study relies on a research design that reliably estimates the causal
effects of sanctions on recidivism and subsequent vehicle accidents.
Specifically, this study draws on nearly 200,000 alcohol tests administered
after state and local police traffic stops from 2001 until 2013. Drunk driving
presents an ideal setting to study the effects of sanctions because of three
things that happen simultaneously. First, when individuals drink, they cannot
dictate or manipulate their blood alcohol content (BAC) level. Second, there
is an artificial but consistent and non-manipulable limit set that determines
the adjudication of an offender versus a non-offender; either someone is over
the legal BAC limit, or he is not. Third, estimating a driver's BAC is done in
a reliable, consistent way without the fear of human manipulation or systemgaming from either the driver or the police.
The goal is to study differences between drivers who are just below the
legal BAC level and drivers just at or above it. More precisely, in the tables
throughout the paper, I compare first-time offenders who have a BAC of
0.065-0.079 with those with a BAC of 0.08-0.094. I also show the robustness
of the results at other ranges close to the legal limit in bandwidth sensitivity
plots. Currently, in Arkansas, a person at orjust above the legal limit typically
spends time in jail, pays a fine and court costs, incurs a 180-day license
suspension, and attends a mandatory victims panel; the person just below the
legal limit goes free. I then compare the recidivism and subsequent vehicle
sanction programs); Weisberg & Petersilia, supra note 6, at 127 (describing how previous efforts
for alternative sanctions "sometimes proved futile because investment in the logistics and the
research basis for the alternative sanctions was often neglected, as if the moral attraction to
alternative sanctions caused policy-makers and reformers to ignore the hard and expensive work
the sanctions require.").
14. See NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS: ALCOHOLIMPAIRED DRIVING 2 fig. 1 (2014), http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/812102.pdf.
15. LAWRENCE J. BLINCOE ET AL., NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., THE
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF MOTOR VEHICLE CRASHES 2000, at 2 (2002), http://wwwnrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/809446.pdf.
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crash rates of these two groups, and also examine the outcomes at a higher
BAC level of 0.15, which triggers a longer license suspension. With a large
comparison group just below, and just at or above the BAC threshold for the
legal limit, one can compare these groups that are statistically
indistinguishable with respect to every variable, except for the sanctions, in
order to isolate the effect of the "treatment" (the sanctions at the legal limit,
in this case) on recidivism and subsequent vehicle accidents. Since it is
theoretically likely (and statistically testable with regard to observable preexisting characteristics of the two groups) that BAC levels in these two
different subgroups are non-strategically chosen, the research design
emulates a randomized experiment-the "gold standard" for causal
inference--close to the BAC threshold that triggers the sanctions.
Three key results emerge from the study. First, the primary channel
through which drunk driving sanctions are effective in reducing recidivism
and crashes is incapacitation, rather than specific deterrence. Second, noncarceral sanctions have varied success based on what form they take and
whom they target. A law passed mandating victims panels, increasing the
length of license suspensions, and stimulating the use of ignition interlock
devices (IIDs)-which require that the driver of a vehicle take an alcohol test
to start or continue driving a vehicle-was effective in reducing crashes both
while the driver's license was suspended and after. The same law was
effective in reducing recidivism during the suspension period, but recidivismreducing effects go away afterwards. In addition, a license suspension
enhancement targeting those at higher blood alcohol content levels was
ineffective in reducing recidivism and crashes. Third, the probability of
recidivism and subsequent crashes for first-time offenders given at least six
to twenty-four hours of jail, fines, and a license suspension was not
statistically distinguishable from the probability of those who received an
alcohol test, but no sanctions.
The study addresses three core challenges in the existing literature. First,
close analysis of non-carceral sanctions invites the opportunity to re-examine
how the purposes of punishment are conceptualized and measured. While a
large group of scholars characterize incapacitation as only incarceration, I
argue that incapacitation should be considered along a continuum, resulting
in a more careful consideration of what kinds of criminal behavior can be
prevented through various forms of incapacitation.
Second, the article demonstrates the effectiveness of non-carceral
sanctions and explores the challenges of isolating the effects of incapacitation
from specific deterrence. Separating out whether crime prevention results
from incapacitation or deterrence brings a set of challenges for institutional
designers and enforcers. Incapacitation restrains the individual's movement
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in some form to prevent recidivism. Deterrence, in turn, measures the extent
to which perceptions of the levels and probabilities of future punishment
influence an individual's decision not to reoffend. 16 Distinguishing the
operative mechanism has important implications for how criminal justice
systems handle crime, for our understanding of how individuals are initially
induced to or prevented from committing crime, and how convicted offenders
respond to sanctions. If incapacitation is found to be the primary channel for
achieving crime reduction, all else being equal, that finding could justify
increasing spending on prisons and stronger non-carceral forms of
incapacitation as a primary means of crime prevention. Alternatively, if
specific deterrence is the primary mechanism, a greater focus on punishment
severity and informing the public about penalties might be more viable
policies to act upon. These two channels are not all-inclusive, nor are they
mutually exclusive. However, separating out their effects rigorously is an
important step in informing criminal justice policy regarding the types, levels,
and targeting of criminal sanctions.
Third, I detail the challenge of making rigorous causal inferences about
the effect of sanctions on future behavior. Isolating the causal effect of
punishment on behavior is challenging, primarily because of the potential
confounding effect of other variables on recidivism and subsequent crashes.
In addition, knowing the counterfactual-what would have happened either
in the absence of the sanctions (i.e. if an enhanced sentence had not been
given to an offender)-is particularly difficult to discern in studies without a
comparison group.
This article proceeds by going into greater depth about the importance of
studying non-carceral sanctions in Section I. Section II discusses three
important challenges for the criminal law and policy field: (1)
conceptualizing incapacitation; (2) measuring specific deterrence versus
incapacitation; and (3) making causal inferences about the effect of sanctions.
The remainder of the paper is dedicated to conducting a quasi-experimental
evaluation of the effect of drunk driving sanctions on recidivism and vehicle
crashes. Section III provides context on the issue of drunk driving. Section
IV discusses the research design of the study. Section V discusses the case
selection, providing detail on the legal and enforcement regime in Arkansas,
the source of my data. Sections VI and VII describe the data and results,
respectively. Section VIII discusses policy and legal reform implications, and
Section X concludes the paper.
16. 1also accept that other purposes of punishment, including rehabilitation and retribution,
are also motivations that guide criminal justice policy that should not be overlooked. This paper
primarily examines incapacitation and deterrence as an important input into an analysis that would
guide legal and policy reform.
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THE IMPORTANCE OF NON-CARCERAL SANCTIONS

Non-carceral sanctions have features that are attractive for a number of
reasons. First, incarceration alternatives offer an important policy option to
achieve the goals of preventing crime and integrating offenders into society.
The effects of this prevention and integration can take place without some of
the negative effects of imprisonment. In particular, hardening and
criminogenic peer learning in prisons can sow the seeds for recidivism and
adverse socioeconomic outcomes. These adverse outcomes include low
educational attainment, high unemployment, and ruptured family and
community structures for those who are incarcerated. Second, non-carceral
sanctions are often less expensive in comparison to incarceration.
Incarceration costs to taxpayers and governments are high. The Vera Institute
estimated taxpayers spend approximately $31,286 annually per inmate, 7 and
a report by the California legislature estimated the annual cost of
incarcerating one inmate in 2008 at some $47,000.18 New York City's
Independent Budget Office released a study stating that in 2012, the City paid
a staggering $167,731 annually to feed, house, and guard each inmate. 9
Third, incarceration alternatives for some offenses might offer a politically
feasible policy route through which the punishment purposes of
incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, and rehabilitation are met, while also
not subjecting offenders to what some have perceived to be inhumane prison
conditions. Fourth, the sanctions give scholars and policymakers the chance
to evaluate the effectiveness of new sanctions technologies, and to offer new
causal mechanisms that link varied punishment types and mixes of sanctions
to differences in recidivism and societal outcomes. Finally, examination of
non-carceral sanctions, as I discuss in Section II, leads to reconsideration of
how we define and measure incapacitation, and also consider the mechanisms
through which these types of sanctions are effective in reducing recidivism
and other negative outcomes.
The existing literature focuses overwhelmingly on the effects of
incarceration, neglecting the useful role that non-carceral sanctions can play
in the mix of sanctions used to control crime. Almost without exception,
17.
PRISONS:

CHRISTIAN HENRICHSON & RUTH DELANEY, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, THE PRICE OF
WHAT
INCARCERATION
COSTS
TAXPAYERS
9
(2012),

http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/Price of Prisons updated version_
072512.pdf.
18. How Much Does It Cost to IncarcerateAn Inmate?, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST'S OFFICE,
http://www.lao.ca.gov/PolicyAreas/CJ/6_cjinmatecost (last visited Nov. 19, 2015).
19. Marc Santora, City's Annual Cost Per Inmate is $168,000, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 24, 2013, at A16, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/24/nyregion/citys-annual-cost-perinmate-is-nearly- 168000-study-says.html.
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previous program evaluations of non-carceral sanctions rely on descriptive
statistical work. While descriptive work can be helpful in discerning
underlying patterns and correlations, such designs are subject to omitted
variable bias and model specification, and often lack a comparison group for
estimating the effect sanctions have on recidivism and other outcomes.
Research designs with strong causal inference strategies have been extremely
rare. These rigorous research designs can shed light on the effectiveness of
these varied sanctions in a variety of domains of punitive, retributive, and
rehabilitative measures used by the state.
Traditionally, policymakers, judges, and interest group advocates have
made non-data-driven judgments about the use of these sanctions. Judges and
policymakers, in particular, often make decisions without reliable data on and
analysis of the effects of non-carceral sanctions. The need for reliable studies
in this area has particularly increased in the post-Booker era, in which the
U.S. Supreme Court made the federal sentencing guidelines advisory. 0
Although policymakers have discussed the benefit of such sanctions from a
cost perspective, one additional advantage is their tendency to facilitate
societal integration. As a result, as discussed previously, offenders might not
experience hardening and negative peer learning that scholars have
mentioned as important drivers of recidivism.

II.

THREE CHALLENGES IN THE LITERATURE

A. ConceptualizingIncapacitation
In the United States, incapacitation became the predominant logic for the
prison boom, as the rehabilitative model that dominated throughout the 1960s
and early 1970s started to wane in popularity.2" Incapacitation features
20.

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).

21.

FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION: PENAL CONFINEMENT

AND THE RESTRAINT OF CRIME 8-12 (1997); Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New
Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy of Correctionsand its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY

449, 450 (1992) (describing the "new penology" as involving "the language of probability and
risk increasingly [replacing] earlier discourses of diagnosis and retributive judgment"). While
Zimring & Hawkins offer a compelling account of a shift in the logic of the prison boom, it is
important to acknowledge that scholars state that incapacitation, in combination with deterrence,
drove the prison boom. See, e.g., BRUCE WESTERN, THE POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF THE PRISON

BOOM 37-38 (2005) (stating that "Republican governors rejected rehabilitation, expanded prison
capacity, and turned the penal system to the twin tasks of incapacitation and deterrence");
Jonathan Simon, Mass Incarceration: From Social Policy to Social Problem, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS 28 (Joan Petersilia & Kevin R. Reitz eds., 2012)

(describing the abandonment of control in California in the 1970s, and the increase in
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prominently as one of the primary purposes of punishment; consequently,

much of the policy discourse on crime reduction overwhelmingly focuses on
the effectiveness of incarceration. To the best of my knowledge, this study is
the first to examine the incapacitation effects of non-carceral sanctions.

In defining incapacitation, a number of scholars have assumed
incarceration as a necessary component of incapacitation. Four examples
provide primafacieevidence in support of this point. Thomas Miles and Jens

Ludwig, define incapacitation as "the inability of an incarcerated person to
commit additional offenses,"22 thus, making incarceration a necessary feature
of incapacitation. William Spelman similarly incorporates incarceration into
his conceptualization of incapacitation: "putting criminals behind bars, where

they can not get at the rest of us." '23 Arjan Blokland and Daniel Nagin
characterize incapacitation as "the crimes averted by their physical isolation
during the period of incarceration,"24 and David Lee and Justin McCrary also
define the term as "the mechanical reduction in crime that occurs when
offenders are incarcerated and unavailable to commit additional crimes. 25
All four definitions of incapacitation equate it with incarceration, and discuss
the prevention of all crimes against society through the isolation incarceration

imposes on an individual.
In this section, I argue that incapacitation can refer to any condition that
limits or restrains the movement of a defendant where the state is acting to
prevent the individual from reoffending in the present or future. Thus,
incarceration that followed, stating the change "abandoned the focus on rehabilitation in favor of
punitive segregation intended to achieve deterrence and, more reliably, incapacitative effects").
22. Thomas J. Miles & Jens Ludwig, The Silence of the Lambdas: DeterringIncapacitation
Research, 23 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 287, 290 (2007).
23. WILLIAM SPELMAN, CRIMINAL INCAPACITATION 1 (1994).
24. Arjan A.J. Blokland & Daniel S. Nagin, Estimating the Effects of Imprisonment:
Intended and UnintendedConsequences of Incarceration,in INCAPACITATION: TRENDS AND NEW
PERSPECTIVES 221, 221 (Marijke Malsch & Marius Duker eds., 2012). Other authors describe
incapacitation or closely related concepts by incorporating incarceration. See, e.g., PETER W.
GREENWOOD & ALLAN ABRAHAMSE, SELECTIVE INCAPACITATION x (1982) (describing ".
incapacitation effect [as] ... those crimes prevented while offenders are incarcerated").
25. David S. Lee & Justin McCrary, The Deterrence Effect of Prison: Dynamic Theory and
Evidence
3
(July
2009)
(unpublished
working
paper)
http://emlab.berkeley.edu/-jmccrary/leeand mccrary2009.pdf.
26. Notably, Marijke Malsch and Marius Duker argue for a similar more expansive
definition of incapacitation, where the term "relates to all sanctions and interventions that aim to
impede, restrict or make impossible certain actions, without necessarily being accompanied by
measures that aim at other goals and effects, such as retribution, rehabilitation, restoration, et
cetera." INCAPACITATION: TRENDS AND NEW PERSPECTIVES, supra note 24, at 1, 2. For additional
broader uses of incapacitation, see ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 21; Jonathan Simon, Total
Incapacitation:The Penal Imaginary and the Rise of an Extreme PenalRationale in California
in the 1970s, in INCAPACITATION: TRENDS AND NEW PERSPECTIVES, supra note 24, at 18-19
(discussing how European governments use incapacitation when referring to probation with
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incapacitation, as the term is conceived here, necessarily involves the degree
to which an individual is monitored and/or restrained, ranging from being
completely unable to reoffend, to having limited degrees in their ability to
recidivate. Some scholars have characterized "total incapacitation" as "the
idea that imprisonment for as long as possible is appropriate whenever an
offender poses any degree of risk to the community. '27 In reality, even more
extreme measures of incapacitation are possible, such as capital punishment,
which truly involves complete and "total" incapacitation of an individual.
Thus, even incarceration is a limited form of incapacitation, since crimes can
be committed both within and outside detention facilities while an individual
is incarcerated. Examples include drug lords and gang leaders running
organized crime rings from prisons,28 inmates committing financial crimes
while being detained, 29 and prisoners engaging in phone scams against
unsuspecting individuals in society.30 Moreover, the possibility of escape also
limits incarceration from being a form of "total" incapacitation.
My focus, though, is on incapacitation alternatives that are less restrictive
than incarceration. I include electronic monitoring, probation, sex offender
registration, protective orders, curfews, ignition interlock devices, and
license suspension in this definition, since they are all designed to restrict the
movement of offenders, and prevent the individual from reoffending. 3'
Incapacitation, thus, includes any punishment that limits a person's
movement or imposes restraint on an individual's action, including the denial
of driving privileges through license suspensions, electronic monitoring of an
individual's movements through surveillance measures, and commitment of
an individual to a mental health facility. 32
community work orders and electronic monitoring, and also using incapacitation to describe the
restrained movement of individuals committed to mental health facilities).
27. Simon, supra note 26, at 18.
28. See, e.g., David Skarbek, Governance and PrisonGangs, 105 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 702,
714 (2011).
29. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Att'y's Office, Federal Prisoner Receives an Additional
184 Months' Imprisonment for Crimes Committed While Incarcerated (Aug. 8, 2013),
http://www.fbi.gov/detroit/press-releases/2013/federal-prisoner-receives-an-additional- 184months-imprisonment-for-crimes-committed-while-incarcerated.
30. John Matarese, Prision Inmate Scam Targeting Cellphones, 10 NEWS (Oct. 25, 2012,
http://www.lOnews.com/money/dont-waste-your-money/prison-inmate-scam7:36
AM),
targeting-cellphones_28104232.
31. It is worth noting that others have characterized these forms of punishment as
incapacitation. See, e.g., Wim Huisman, The Application of Administrative Law Against
Organized Crime: Refusing and Revoking Licenses as Incapacitation, in INCAPACITATION:
TRENDS AND NEW PERSPECTIVES, supra note 24, at 185, 185.
32. For an extensive treatment of probation supervision, home confinement, and electronic
monitoring, see generally SMART SENTENCING: THE EMERGENCE OF INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS,
supra note 12.
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Embedded in nearly all of the definitions of incapacitation, either
explicitly or implicitly, is the notion of a counterfactual. Specifically, the
person being incapacitated is prevented from committing crimes that could
have been committed had he or she not been subject to the incapacitation.
Yet, the precise nature of the counterfactual is difficult to specify because it
depends in large measure on the purpose of the incapacitation-whether, for
instance, the individual is being restrained from action to prevent any kind of
crime, whether he or she is being isolated from society, or whether the
individual is being restrained exclusively from the crime he or she originally
committed. Alana Barton describes the difficulty of precisely specifying this
counterfactual, which she describes as "hypothetical crimes."
Unlike with retribution, inherent in the theory of incapacitation is a notion
of societal risk, punishment is not concerned with the nature of the offender,
as is the case with rehabilitation, or with the nature of the offense, as is the
case with retribution. Rather, punishment is justified by the risk individuals
are believed to pose to society in the future. As a result, individuals can be
punished for "hypothetical" crimes. In other words, they can be incarcerated,
not for crimes they have actually committed but for crimes it is anticipated or
assumed they will commit.33
Not only are these "hypothetical crimes" a key part of what drives the
punishment decision, they also shape a society's notion of risk,34 along with
media-fueled insecurity about public safety and the salience of "tough on
crime" rhetoric in the political arena. Figure 1 shows a conceptualization of
incapacitation along a continuum, with varied purposes for incapacitation, the
forms of punishment that incapacitation can take, and the category of the
punishment mechanism. In discussing purpose, it is important to note that all
punishments for incapacitation can also have retributive, deterrent,
rehabilitative, and other purposes. The four purposes I highlight-preventing
the individual from committing any crime, isolating the individual from
society, monitoring or restraining the individual's movement within society,
and preventing the individual from committing the individual crime he or she
committed previously-are meant to be non-mutually-exclusive "ideal
types."35 As a result, I placed a number of punishments that involve
33.

Alana Barton, IncapacitationTheory, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PRISONS & CORRECTIONAL

FACILITIES 463 (Mary Bosworth ed., 2005).

34. See, e.g., Loic Wacquant, Deadly Symbiosis: When Ghetto and PrisonMeet and Mesh,
in MASS IMPRISONMENT: SOCIAL CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 82, 82 (David Garland ed., 2001)
(describing how adverse targeting resulting from risk perceptions creates extremely high levels
of"hyper-incarceration" in certain communities); see also Seidman, supra note 8, at 129.
35. Worth noting is an important line of research that offered the concept of "selective
incapacitation," which, unlike the more traditional form of incapacitation, is characterized by
assigning punishment strictly based on the risk the individual poses to society by reoffending.
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monitoring, such as probation and electronic monitoring between the two
purposes.
I suggest the use of four subtypes for incapacitation to help clarify these
four purposes: targeted incapacitation, monitored incapacitation, isolated
incapacitation, and complete incapacitation. Targeted incapacitation refers to
preventing the individual from recommitting the crime that led to the
punishment. In the case of drunk driving, ignition interlock devices (IIDs) are
a clear example of this type of incapacitation. IlDs are typically installed on
the dashboard or steering wheel of the vehicle, and require that a person take
a breath test under a pre-specified limit in order to start the car. The Borg
Warner Company introduced the first IID in 1970, but they did not become
popular until the 1990s when several new features became standard and the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) developed
standards for the devices in 1992.36 In the past, their ability to incapacitate
previous offenders from drunk driving was limited since testing with the
device was only required to start the vehicle; a second person could blow into
the IID, and allow the offender to drive. Today's devices are more
sophisticated, and there are IlDs that require breath tests while the individual
is driving, and randomize the timing of when the test is required. Figure 5(a)
in Appendix I(A) shows an 1iD attached to the dashboard of a vehicle, and
Figure 5(b) shows a person taking an IID breath test. IIDs are discussed in
greater detail in Section IV(A). These devices offer a clear example of
targeted incapacitation, since they are designed to prevent a previous offender
from committing the crime the person originally committed (in this case,
drunk driving). Another sanction in this category is license suspension, which
is designed to target the behavior of erratic driving of any form. 7
Unlike more traditional forms of incapacitation, selective incapacitation does not sentence based
on the crime committed, but rather based on the risk profile of the individual, irrespective of the
crime.
36. Robert Voas & Paul Marques, History of Alcohol Vehicle Interlock Programs: Lost
OpportunitiesandNew Possibilities,PACIFIC INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH AND EVALUATION (2014),
http://www.researchgate.net/publication/242204156_History_of AlcoholVehicleInterlockPr
ogramsLost OpportunitiesandNewPossibilities.
37. Although not commonly practiced in the United States at present, involuntary
sterilization (also referred to as forced sterilization or compulsory sterilization) and chemical
castration present additional examples of targeted incapacitation. However, the practice, when
used against those convicted of rape, may still not incapacitate a person from committing that
crime. Involuntary sterilization also reportedly took place targeting the mentally handicapped,
mentally ill, the hearing and visually impaired, and epileptics, as part of a eugenics movement
that was conducted under the laws in a number of different states. These forms of punishment
would not qualify as targeted incapacitation. Other U.S. sterilization programs have targeted
prisoners and racial minorities, including African Americans and Native Americans. Although
the practice continues today among individuals and groups, the only government known to
conduct involuntary sterilization today is Uzbekistan. Natalia Antelava, Uzbekistan's Policy of
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Figure 1: The Incapacitation Continuum

License suspension is also an example of a second category of
incapacitation-monitored incapacitation. Although in the United States
license suspensions (and revocations) are primarily used for vehicle-related

offenses, some states use them for non-vehicle related offenses. Virginia, for
example, revokes driving privileges for making a bomb threat, and nonvehicle related drug offenses.3 8 Massachusetts issues license suspensions for
Secretly Sterilising Women, BBC NEWS (Apr. 11, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine17612550. For additional information on compulsory sterilization, see generally DANIEL J.
KEVLES, IN THE NAME OF EUGENICS: GENETICS AND THE USES OF HUMAN HEREDITY (1985);

Caroline M. Wong, Chemical Castration: Oregon's Innovative Approach to Sex Offender
Rehabilitation, or UnconstitutionalPunishment?, 80 OR. L. REV. 267 (2001); Paul Lombardo,
Eugenic Sterilization Laws, IMAGE ARCHIVE ON THE AM. EUGENICS MOVEMENT,
http://www.eugenicsarchive.org/html/eugenics/essay8text.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2016).
38. Reinstating Driving
Privleges, VA.
DEP'T
OF
MOTOR
VEHICLES,
http://www.dmv.virginia.gov/drivers/#reinstate.asp (last visited Oct. 30, 2015).
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failure to pay child support, non-vehicle related drug offenses, state income
39
tax violations, outstanding arrests, and failure to register as a sex offender.
In the case of motor vehicle violations, license suspensions are designed to
prevent the offender from engaging in dangerous driving. However, other
purposes, including restraining an individual's movement and retribution, are
likely to be at work related to offenses like failure to pay child support or
taxes. Other sanctions, such as protective orders, sex offender registration,
electronic monitoring, and probation also clearly fall under this purpose of
incapacitation.
Isolated incapacitation falls in line with the more common
conceptualization and operationalization of incapacitation. Isolated
incapacitation involves the separation of the individual from society for the
purpose of minimizing (but not eliminating) the risk of recidivism for any
crime. Sanctions in this category include some form of incarceration.
Although more extreme forms of incarceration are possible, such as solitary
confinement, the possibility of a person reoffending still make it a limited
form of incapacitation.4"
Only capital punishment is a truly "complete" form of incapacitation in
which the individual is unable to reoffend. More extreme forms of
punishment such as dismemberment might make recidivism of certain
crimes-and possibly any crimes-impossible while the person is under
custody. In these cases, these forms of punishment may also qualify as
complete incapacitation.
Two caveats merit attention with respect to categories of purposes on the
continuum. First is the issue Barton raises about "hypothetical crimes," or the
crimes for which the incapacitation is targeted at preventing.41 Looking at the
purposes on the continuum, on one end, we see that specific incapacitation is
directed at preventing the specific crime the individual committed, and on the
other end total incapacitation is directed at preventing the offender from
committing any future crime. These purposes are intended to be extreme
endpoints of a continuum, with the location of punishment form between
those two endpoints being determined by the number and severity of crimes
at which the incapacitation is directed. Second, although scholars such as
Jonathan Simon include incarceration in what he terms "total
OF
MASS.,
DRIVER'S
MANUAL
50-51
(2013)
39. COMMONWEALTH
http://www.massrmv.com/rmv/dmanual/DriversManual.pdf.
40. Michael Montgomery, Gangs Reach Out of Prison to Commit Crimes, NATIONAL
3:34
PM),
PUBLIC
RADIO
(Mar.
7,
2005,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=4525733 (describing how gang members
in the Pelican Bay State Prison in California's isolated supermax unit run street gangs from the
facility).
141. Barton, supra note 33, at 463.
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incapacitation, '42 I believe, for the reasons previously stated, that this term
should be exclusively used to describe execution or extreme forms of
punishment, such as certain forms of dismemberment, that make an
individual physically incapable of reoffending.
The level of incapacitation refers to the degree of restraint against an
individual's freedom of movement each punishment typically represents. I
acknowledge a degree of subjectivity in placing various punishments along
this continuum, especially since sub-categories of the punishments and
individual circumstances might make certain punishments more restrictive
than others in ostensibly harsher punishment categories. For example, bail
could vary greatly in the degree to which it imposes restraint on an individual,
based on an individual's willingness to pay, access to funds, income level,
and the number of days in jail the individual faces as an alternative, among
other factors. Despite this issue, I believe the categories can still serve an
important purpose in providing a more refined notion of incapacitation.
The conceptualization of incapacitation is critical in informing decisions
about the measurement and operationalization of variables in an empirical
analysis, and also provides a framework for thinking about the purposes of
incapacitation with non-carceral sanctions. A number of implications emerge
from the conceptualization. First, a broader conceptualization of
incapacitation inclusive of a wider array of non-carceral sanctions is
important. Research that investigates the effectiveness of these punishments
not only informs public policy, but also reflects risks that policymakers are
willing to take with the integration of offenders in society with various
punishments and reveals the reasoning behind their punishment. Second, with
a more granular notion of incapacitation, we then are able to focus on
measuring incapacitation effects in different ways. This would motivate a
research agenda about the effectiveness of different forms of monitoring, and
its effects on crime, and other outcomes of substantive interest to both
scholars and policymakers.
B. UntanglingIncapacitationfrom Specific Deterrence
Even with a more refined notion of incapacitation, another important
challenge remains: separating out incapacitation from specific deterrence.
Specific deterrence, which refers to how the threat of future sanctions stops
an individual criminal from reoffending, is an important mechanism that has
an effect on regulating crime. If specific deterrence is working, then the focus
42. See Jonathan Simon, How Should We Punish Murder, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1241, 1254
n.50 (2010).
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of policy should be oriented toward increasing sanction levels and
punishment probabilities. If incapacitation is the primary means through
which crime is being reduced, restraining the individual's movement in some
form is what prevents recidivism and reduces crime.
Distinguishing what mechanism is primarily at work has important
implications for how criminal justice systems will handle crime, and for how
criminal behavior can be altered. Separating out incapacitation versus
specific deterrence effects in a rigorous causal manner is an important step in
informing policy regarding the types, levels, and targeting of criminal
sanctions. The effectiveness of each also has important implications for
budget allocations toward crime reduction and maintaining public safety, and
also can have an important social impact on the friends and family of the
43
offender, along with future prospects of education, employment, and health.
Isolating these effects is challenging for a number of reasons. First,
changes that increase punishment affect both deterrence and incapacitation at
the same time." Second, confounding is also introduced by changes in policy
and society taking place at the same time as when a sentence enhancement is
45
enacted, making it challenging to determine the causal effect of sentencing.
Third, the absence of a counterfactual that would shed light on what would
happen if such a policy were not enacted also complicates making the
outcome directly attributable to the punishment policy.
This paper is, by no means, the first to attempt to isolate the effects of
deterrence and incapacitation in a causal manner. Daniel Kessler and Steven
D. Levitt, to the best of my knowledge, were the first to separate out
incapacitation from deterrence by using California's Proposition 8, which
increased the severity of sentences for repeat offenders for some crimes, but
not others.4 6 Of particular relevance to this study is Lee and McCrary's The
Deterrence Effect of Prison:Dynamic Theory and Evidence, which relies on
the same quasi-experimental design to measure the effects of harsher
penalties in adult versus juvenile sentencing regimes on recidivism in

43. See Emily G. Owens, More Time, Less Crime? Estimating the IncapacitativeEffect of
Sentence Enhancements, 52 J.L. & ECON. 551, 552, 568-72 (2009).
44. Daniel Kessler & Steven D. Levitt, Using Sentence Enhancements to Distinguish
Between DeterrenceandIncapacitation,42 J.L. & ECON. 343, 343-44 (1999).
45. See Owens, supra note 43, at 552.
46. See Kessler & Levitt, supra note 44, at 345, 348; see also David S. Abrams, Estimating
the Deterrent Effect of Incarceration Using Sentencing Enhancements, 4 AM. ECON. J. 32, 33
(2012) (citing Francesco Drago et al., The Deterrent Effects of Prison Evidencefrom a Natural
Experiment, 117 J. POL. ECON. 257 (2009); Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, Does Three
Strikes Deter? A Non-ParametricInvestigation, 42 J. HUM. RESOURCES 309 (2007)); Owens,
supra note 43, at 552-53
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Florida.47 Unlike Kessler and Levitt, who find a deterrence effect and no
incapacitation effect,4 8 Lee and McCrary essentially find the opposite-that
the main mechanism through which penalties are having an effect is
incapacitation, rather than deterrence.4 9
This research examines incapacitation and deterrence effects for noncarceral sanctions. The policy consequences of non-carceral sanctions for
both incapacitation and deterrence are significant. If we find that there are
incapacitation effects for non-carceral sanctions, the sanctions might achieve
similar effects at a fraction of the cost of incarceration, and the sanctions
could be used to reduce prison overcrowding. Relatedly, the incarceration
alternatives examined might also reduce some of the negative effects of
incarceration, including criminogenic peer learning and hardening, which are
thought to increase recidivism. If deterrence effects are found, then the
introduction of lower threshold penalties could potentially lead to more
effective targeting of sanctions. There could be a "ratcheting down" of
sanctions for those that lie close to the margin for incarceration, which could
result in a more effective use of marginal deterrence.50 Moreover, the paper
not only examines incapacitation effects on recidivism, but it also examines
the effects on vehicle crashes, another outcome with important societal
consequences.

C. Movingfrom Correlationto Causation:Making CausalInferences
About the Effects ofPunishment
Determining the causal effect of crime and corrections policy brings its
own set of challenges for legal scholars, policymakers, criminologists, and
other social scientists. Although previous studies have examined the
determinants of recidivism, most have done so in a correlational or predictive
manner using various forms of regression analyses to control for factors such

47. See Lee & McCrary, supra note 25, at 32.
48. See Kessler & Levitt, supranote 44, at 349.
49. Although Lee and McCrary conclude that "if lengthening prison sentences leads to
significant crime reduction, it is likely operating through a direct, 'mechanical' incapacitation
effect, rather than through a behavioral response to the threat of punishment," they also state that
"deterrence elasticities with respect to sentence lengths are no more negative than -0.13 for young
offenders." See Lee & McCrary, supranote 25, at 1,4.
50. Marginal deterrence is the idea that the severity of the crime committed or the number
of crimes committed should determine the level of punishment, so that offenders who commit
more severe and/or numerous crimes should be punished more severely. The idea is that the
presence of marginal deterrence would properly incentivize offenders and would-be offenders not
to benefit from committing additional crimes, including future crimes of greater severity.
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as criminal history, which could lead to recidivism.51 While these approaches
with observational data can show correlation, the results often depend on a
number of strong assumptions, especially when making causal inferences
about the effect of an intervention on an outcome.
There is a relatively strong consensus among econometricians,
statisticians, and other quantitative social scientists that regression results
from observational data, without some form of random variation (also
referred to as exogenous variation), are highly sensitive. 2 The results often
impose a number of modeling assumptions on the data, especially because
they can be very sensitive to unobserved factors that can drive the results.
Experimental and quasi-experimental methods offer ways of dealing with
these important issues.53
To facilitate understanding of the importance of causal inference and the
pitfalls of regression, a short discussion of the Neyman-Rubin Causal Model54
51. See, e.g., Ted Chiricos et al., The Labeling of Convicted Felons and its Consequences
for Recidivism, 45 CRIMINOLOGY 547, 560 (2007); Douglas A. Smith & Patrick R. Gartin,
Specifying Specific Deterrence:The Influence ofArrest on FutureCriminalActivity, 54 AM. Soc.
REV. 94, 100-01 (1989); Cassia Spohn & David Holleran, The Effect of Imprisonment on
Recidivism Rates of Felony Offenders: A Focus on Drug Offenders, 40 CRIMINOLOGY 329, 33436 (2002); Yan Zhang et al., The Impact of State Sentencing Policies on the U.S. Prison
Population, 37 J. CRIM. JUST. 190, 191 (2009).
52. See, e.g., Daniel E. Ho & Donald B. Rubin, Credible Causal Inference for Empirical
Legal Studies, 7 ANN. REV. L. Soc. Sc1. 17, 26 (2011) ("For causal inference, the overwhelming
recognition in applied statistics is that regression alone is fragile."); see generallyRICHARD BERK,
A CONSTRUCTIVE CRITIQUE (2004); CHARLES F. MANSKI,
REGRESSION ANALYSIS:
IDENTIFICATION PROBLEMS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1995); DONALD B. RUBIN, MATCHED
SAMPLING FOR CAUSAL EFFECTS (2006); Joshua D. Angrist & Alan B. Krueger, Empirical
Strategies in Labor Economics, in HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 1277 (Orley Ashenfelter &
David Card eds., 1999); Rajeev H. Dehejia & Sadek Wahba, CausalEffects in Non-Experimental
Studies: Reevaluating the Evaluation of TrainingPrograms,94 J. AM. STAT. ASS'N 1053 (1999);
Daniel E. Ho et al., Matching as NonparametricPreprocessingfor Reducing Model Dependence
in ParametricCausalInference, 15 POL. ANALYSIS 199 (2007); Gary King & Langche Zeng, The
Dangers of Extreme Counterfactuals, 14 POL. ANALYSIS 131 (2006); Robert J. Lalonde,
Evaluatingthe Econometric Evaluations of Training Programswith Experimental Data, 76 AM.
ECON. REV. 604 (1986); Donald B. Rubin, Bayesian Inferencefor Causality: The Importance of
Randomization, 6 ANNALS STAT. 34 (1978) [hereinafter Rubin, Bayesian Inference]; Donald B.
Rubin, Matching to Remove Bias in Observational Studies, 29 BIOMETRICS 159 (1973)
[hereinafter Rubin, Matching to Remove Bias]; Jeff Strnad, Should Legal Empiricists Go
Bayesian?, 9 AM. L. ECON. REV. 195 (2007).
53. Experiments are but one of a number of different methods used to make causal
inferences about the effect of X on Y. In addition to a host of quasi-experimental methods,
including the two used in this paper, there are also qualitative methods and deductive theories one
can use to produce causal inferences.
54. The Neyman-Rubin Causal Model, is also called the Neyman-Holland-Rubin Causal
Model, the Rubin Causal Model, and the potential outcomes framework for causal inference. I
draw heavily on Jasjeet Sekhon's description of the history and technical notation of the NeymanHolland-Rubin Causal Model. For a more detailed history of the model, see Jasjeet S. Sekhon,
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is in order. The model clarifies a precise approach to causation, which we can
then examine in the context of sentencing. Jerzy Neyman first developed the
idea of a potential outcomes framework in which each observation in the
study had two potential outcomes; it could be assigned to either a treatment
or a control group.55 The causal effect is defined by the difference between
these two potential outcomes, but we are unable to observe one of these
outcomes, since the same unit of analysis cannot travel back in time and
experience the counterfactual.16 In an influential paper, Paul Holland dubbed
this the "fundamental problem of causal inference."57 As a result, we never
directly observe and measure a causal effect, but only make causalinferences
about the effect of some treatment or intervention on an outcome. In a series
of papers, William G. Cochran and Donald Rubin later developed a
framework for thinking about the Neyman model with application to research
with observational data.18 For an experimental research design to be executed
effectively, the design requires at a minimum (1) specification of the
treatment and control; (2) random assignment of the treatment to the
randomization group; and (3) numerosity of observations in the treatment and
control groups.59 The random assignment of the treatment is what allows one
The Neyman-Rubin Model of CausalInference and Estimationvia Matching Methods, in OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL METHODOLOGY 271, 272-73 (Janet Box-Steffensmeier et al. eds.,
2008).
55. See Jerzy Splawa-Neyman et al., On the Application of Probability Theory to
AgriculturalExperiments, 5 STAT. Sci. 465, 471-72 (1990).
56. More formally, if we let Yitdenote the potential outcome for unit i if that unit receives
treatment t, and Yic denotes the potential outcome for the same unit in the control group c, then
the treatment effect, Ti is defined by Ti = Yit- Yic.
57. Paul W. Holland, Statistics and Causal Inference, 81 J. AM. STAT. ASS'N. 945, 947-48
(1986).
58. See generally RUBIN, supra note 52; William G. Cochran, Matching in Analytical
Studies, 43 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH & NATION'S HEALTH 684 (1953); William G. Cochran, The
Planningof ObservationalStudies ofHuman Populations,128 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC'Y.,SERIES A
234 (1965); Rubin, Matching to Remove Bias, supra note 52, at 159; Donald B. Rubin, Estimating
CausalEffects of Treatments in Randomized and NonrandomizedStudies, 66 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL.
688 (1974); Donald B. Rubin, Multivariate Matching Methods that are Equal Percent Bias
Some Examples, 32 BIOMETRICS 109 (1976); Donald B. Rubin, Multivariate
Reducing, I.Matching Methods That are Equal PercentBias Reducing, I: Maximums on Bias Reduction for
Fixed Sample Sizes, 32 BIOMETRICS 121 (1976); Rubin, Bayesian Inference, supra note 52;
Donald B. Rubin, Using Multivariate MatchedSampling andRegression Adjustment to Control
Bias in ObservationalStudies, 74 J. AM. STAT. ASS'N. 318 (1979).
59. Although experiments can be done with relatively small numbers of observations, the
point is that ex-ante, most researchers would like to have sufficient statistical power to detect a
treatment effect. In order to obtain a treatment effect, the number of observations in the treatment
and control groups must be sufficiently large, such that if we let 60 denote the expected treatment
effect size, a = significance level (or the probability of a Type I error), f8 = a given power level,
s = standard deviation, and z = the 1 - flquartile of the normal distribution, we can use the
following formula to calculate the statistical power needed to obtain a treatment effect: 8o =
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to make strong causal inferences about the effects of the intervention on the
outcome, because, in expectation, all unobserved factors are balanced across
the treatment and control groups. I say "in expectation" because in order for
all unobservable factors uncorrelated with the treatment to be "controlled
for," the randomization has to have "worked." There is an expectation of
equivalence across the treatment and control groups because across multiple
random draws, there will be equivalence across the groups on all observed
and unobserved variables. However, any one given draw may not achieve
equivalence. In practice, experimenters typically verify whether there is
equivalence on observed variables across the treatment and control groups in
the data to see if the randomization at least worked for those factors that can
be observed.6" Often, the most important variable to have equivalence on in
experimental work is the lagged outcome (e.g. if one analyzed the effect of
an intervention on recidivism, one would search for equivalence across the
treatment and control groups based on the individuals' criminal histories).
Experiments do come with their own set of drawbacks. The main one, for
our purposes, is the issue of external validity-the ability to generalize from
the results across time, context, and alternative realizations of treatments.
Typically, there are two approaches to dealing with the issue. The first is
using replication of experiments across various times, contexts, and
realizations in order to examine the stability of the results. The second is to
develop theories of equivalence and expected results that would allow one to
generalize beyond the randomization group.
In the case of examining the effect of sanctions at the legal limit or
increased punishment, the treatment is the enhanced sentence, 6 relative to a
Za

+

zl-f),

2

2

El+

2

-
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It is worth noting that these conditions are necessary, but not sufficient,

for an effective experimental design to be executed. The discussion is circumscribed to these
conditions in order to make the points necessary for the substantive discussion.
60. Debate exists in the literature about whether one can and should control for factors after
an experiment has been conducted, in the event of not having equivalence (also known as balance)
on a variable (in this case, referred to as a covariate) across the treatment and control groups. See,
e.g., David A. Freedman, On Regression Adjustments to Experimental Data, 40 ADVANCES
APPLIED MATHEMATICS 180 (2008); Winston Lin, Agnostic Notes on Regression Adjustments to
Experimental Data: Reexamining Freedman's Critique, 7 ANNALS APPLIED STAT. 295 (2013);
Donald P. Green, Regression Adjustments to Experimental Data: Do David Freedman's Concerns
Apply to Political Science? 20-22 (July 8, 2009) (paper presented at the annual meeting of the
Society for Political Methodology).
61. A sentence enhancement increases the severity of a punishment based on some
established criterion or "trigger." Sentence enhancements are typically increased either because
of a prior conviction or because of the more serious nature of a particular offense. For an in-depth
examination of recidivist enhancements, see Sarah French Russell, Rethinking Recidivist
Enhancements: The Role of PriorDrug Convictions in Federal Sentencing, 43 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1135, 1143-46(2010).
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control group that receives a reduced sentence.62 Under the potential
outcomes framework, we would ideally want to observe the same individual
at the same time receiving and serving both the enhanced and "normal"
sentences. Because of the fundamental problem of causal inference, there is
an impossibility of observing the counterfactual outcome (e.g., if the person
was assigned to the treatment group and received the sentence enhancement,
it is not possible to know what would have happened if the same person had
received the reduced sentence, and vice versa). Consequently, as I stated
earlier, we can only make causal inferences about the effect of the sentence
enhancement (the "treatment") by attempting to simulate the counterfactual
and discuss the results in probabilistic terms.63
A number of factors specific to evaluating the effects of criminal sanctions
make it challenging to arrive at causal inferences. First, the severity of
punishments can interact with a number of other factors simultaneously,
creating difficulties in isolating the effects of the marginal sentence severity.
Second, discretion in the criminal system-especially police profiling;
prosecutorial discretion to charge, bargain, or drop cases; and judicial
discretion in sentencing-can result in selection effects, complicating the
determination of the effects of treatments on outcomes. Third, unobserved
characteristics of a defendant that lead to harsher sentences may also have an
impact on the defendant's probability of recidivating, and also for our study,
getting into a subsequent vehicle crash. Taken together, these and other
factors make designing and conducting a study with credible causal inference
a rather challenging endeavor to undertake.
III.

THE CASE OF DRUNK DRIVING

Sentencing for drunk driving provides an opportunity to examine a
number of these challenges in the literature on crime and criminal law, while
also applying the conceptualization of incapacitation previously discussed.
First, drunk driving sentencing is applied in a manner that enables strong
causal inferences to be made about the effects of punishment. As was
discussed previously, studies of the effects of criminal sanctions frequently
suffer from the problems of selection bias. Sentences are rarely, if ever,
randomly assigned, and so the difficulty arises in making causal inferences
62. Ho and Rubin offer a similarly helpful example from the literature on the effect of prison
conditions on recidivism to illustrate the point. Ho & Rubin, supra note 52, at 22-26.
63. Additional assumptions in the model include no stable unit treatment value assumption
(SUTVA), which assumes no "contamination" of the units in the treatment group either through,
for example, contact with someone in the control group, affecting their outcomes. In addition,
there cannot be "hidden" administration of the treatment. See id. at 21.
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about the effect of the sentence on behavior when there are a wide range of
unobservable variables that could be driving recidivism and subsequent
crashes. With drunk driving, sentencing in most jurisdictions is principally
determined by BAC. The formulaic, non-discretionary, and quantifiable
aspects of the sentence make it amenable to a quasi-experimental design. This
design allows for a more rigorous study of the effects of punishments, since
unobservable factors correlated with the assignment of a set of sanctions
(whether they are at the legal limit or are an enhancement) are taken care of
(in expectation) with the quasi-experimental feature of the research design.
Second, when sentencing for drunk driving offenses, judges can choose a
variety of sanctions along the incapacitation continuum, including
incarceration, ignition interlock devices (liDs),6 4 vehicle impoundment, and
license suspensions. liDs require the driver to be breathalyzed before
operating a vehicle.65 If the driver's BAC is above the permitted level set by
a court or administrative agency, the device can prevent the vehicle from
starting. 66 To prevent non-drivers from giving samples, more recent IIDs
require the driver to give breath samples while he or she is driving at
randomly determined time intervals (typically between five minutes and one
hour). Some IIDs also photograph drivers while a breath sample is given.
Despite these safeguards, offenders can still circumvent IlDs by driving a
vehicle without a device.67
Two other alternative sanctions-license suspensions 61 and vehicle
impoundment-rely on weaker and stronger forms of incapacitation,
respectively, than IIDs. Like IIDs, license suspensions also attempt to
prohibit a DWI offender from driving altogether. A number of empirical
studies have found that license suspensions are effective in reducing DWI
recidivism.69 Peck, et al., for instance state "[T]here is no question that license
suspensions have a significant effect in reducing the accident and drunk
driving frequency of convicted DUI offenders ... the overall consistency of
64. The devices are also referred to as breath alcohol ignition interlock devices (BAIID) or
simply ignition interlock devices. See NAT'L. HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., IGNITION
INTERLOCKS-WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW 1 (2d ed. 2014) [hereinafter NHTSA REPORT].
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.at 3.
68. For the sake of simplicity, we group license suspension and revocation under the same
umbrella.
69. See, e.g., Robert B. Voas, Evaluation of Jail as a Penalty for Drunken Driving, 2
ALCOHOL DRUGS & DRIVING 47 (1986); R. C. Peck et al., The Comparative Effectiveness of
Alcohol Rehabilitationand Licensing ControlActions for Drunk Driving Offenders: A Review of
the Literature,I ALCOHOL DRUGS & DRIVING 15 (1985); James L. Nichols & H. Laurence Ross,
The Effectiveness of Legal Sanctions in Dealing with Drinking Drivers, 6 ALCOHOL DRUGS &
DRIVING 33 (1990).
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the results from different investigators, using different quasi-experimental
designs, precludes any other conclusion."7
Yet, despite the extant literature, license suspensions still remain a
relatively weak form of incapacitation, since enforcement of the sanction is
challenging and largely passive, with stops for other offenses, or at sobriety
checkpoints, being the main means through which license suspensions are
enforced. 7' To date, very few scholars have examined the causal effect of
license suspensions on recidivism. Realizing the limitations of license
suspensions, a number of states enacted more aggressive laws targeting the
vehicle. Sanctions have included registration cancellation, special license
plates or plate stickers for DWI offenders, 72 license plate confiscation, 3
vehicle impoundment, and vehicle forfeiture.74 These programs, which were
mostly targeted at the most egregious offenders, resulted in reducing
recidivism,7 5 and were also seen as draconian in the costs they imposed on
the offender and his or her family.7 6 Because they were not viewed as a policy
that could be applied broadly, and because of the availability of IlDs as an
alternative, other vehicle-based sanctioning has declined in recent years.
Taken together, the varying degree of incapacitation, and the variety of noncarceral sanctions used in DWI sentencing offer an important first step in the
study of this type of punishment.
Fourth, along with the wide range of incapacitation, DWI is also expansive
in its prevalence, not only in the more than one million arrested every year
for impaired driving, but also in the range of socioeconomic groups arrested
for DWI. Although those arrested are overwhelmingly male (approximately
70-80%), offenders are heterogeneous in terms of race, income, and region,
allowing for the study of heterogeneous effects across these subgroups.

Peck et al., supra note 69, at 57.
Robert B. Voas et al., Temporary Vehicle Immobilization: Evaluation ofa Programin
ACCIDENT ANALYSIS PREVENTION 635, 635 (1997).
R. B. VOAS & A. S. TIPPETTS, U.S. DEP'T TRANSP., ASSESSMENT OF IMPOUNDMENT AND
FORFEITURE LAWS FOR DRIVERS CONVICTED OF DUI, PHASE II REPORT: EVALUATION OF OREGON
AND WASHINGTON VEHICLE PLATE ZEBRA STICKER LAWS 5-6 (1994); H. Laurence Ross et al.,
License Plate Confiscationfor PersistentAlcohol Impaired Drivers, 28 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS &
PREVENTION 53, 53 (1996).
73. Voas et al., supra note 71, at 635-36.
74. For a comprehensive survey of vehicle-targeted DWI sanctions, see ROBERT B. VOAS,
U.S. DEP'T TRANSP., ASSESSMENT OF IMPOUNDMENT AND FORFEITURE LAWS FOR DRIVERS
CONVICTED OF DWI PHASE I REPORT: REVIEW OF STATE LAWS AND THEIR APPLICATION 48-57
(1992).
75. Randy W. Elder et al., Effectiveness of Ignition Interlocks for Preventing AlcoholImpairedDriving andAlcohol-Related Crashes:A Community Guide Systematic Review, 40 AM.
J. PREVENTIVE MED. 362, 362-63 (2011).
76. Id. at 363.
70.
71.
Ohio, 29
72.
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Finally, although the study of drunk driving provides a number of
advantages that for theoretical and conceptual reasons make it amenable to a
rigorous research design, the crime itself has serious practical implications
for society. Despite active interest group campaigns and steep penalties,
drunk driving remains a relatively widespread phenomenon in the United
States. NHTSA reported that 32,885 driving-related fatalities took place in
2010, and 10,228 of them-a staggering 31.1%-were the result of drunk
driving.77 Of the roughly 10.4 million drunk driving arrests that are made,7"
approximately one third involve repeat offenders.7 9 The cost of accidents
alone to federal and local governments, and taxpayers, was estimated in 2002
(and thus, undoubtedly a conservative estimate of today's costs) to be
approximately fifty-one billion dollars per year, excluding deaths and
injuries."0 Steven D. Levitt and J. Porter estimate the externality imposed on
society by drunk driving may be as high as $8,000 for each incident of drunk
driving." Drunk driving, thus, has important negative consequences on
society, and, like with drug use, involves sentencing for at least a segment of
the population that is prone to addiction. Regulating crimes that stem from
addictive behavior presents challenges in which increased punishment may
be ineffective. Understanding empirically when subgroups are not responsive
to more traditional sanctions may result in more effectively targeting
sanctions, and reallocating resources effectively, to reduce the recurrence of
the crime.

77.

NAT'L HIGHWAY

TRAFFIC

SAFETY ADMIN.,

TRAFFIC

SAFETY FACTS:

ALCOHOL-

IMPAIRED DRIVING 6 tbl.4 (2010), www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/811606.pdf [hereinafter TRAFFIC
SAFETY FACTS 2010].

78. In all likelihood, as Roth points out, this commonly cited figure from the FBI crime
statistics is likely to be a conservative estimate. See RICHARD ROTH, 2013 SURVEY OF
(2013),
n.2
2
U.S.
THE
IN
INTERLOCKS
CURRENTLY-INSTALLED
http://www.transportation.nebraska.gov/nohs/pdf/lgnitionInterlockSurveyU S.pdf.
79. NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., CASE STUDIES OF IGNITION INTERLOCK
PROGRAMS 5 (2012); Philip J. Cook & Maeve E. Gearing, The Breathalyzer Behind the Wheel,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/31/opinion/31cook.html?_r=0;
see also FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2011: ESTIMATED NUMBER OF ARRESTS tbl.29 (2011),
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/201 1/crime-in-the-u.s.-201 I/tables/table29.
80. BLINCOE ET AL., supra note 15, at 2.
81. Steven D. Levitt & Jack Porter, How Dangerous are Drinking Drivers?, 109 J. POL.
ECON. 1198, 1198 (2001).
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THE EMPIRICAL APPROACH

A. The Regression DiscontinuityDesign
The "gold standard" for making causal inferences with quantitative
methods is the randomized experiment. 2 In the case of sentence
enhancements and DWI recidivism, the ideal experiment would involve
randomly assigning the sentence either at the legal limit or an enhanced
sentence (in this case, the treatment) to first-time offenders, while a control
group would receive no sanctions or the sentence without the enhancement.
This experience would include a large number of defendants in the treatment
and control groups, so that in expectation, the process of random assignment
would ensure that both the treatment and control groups would be comparable
to each other on both observed and unobserved characteristics associated with
the treatment. 83 While an experiment of this sort would be ideal for causal
inference, a number of practical limitations, including ethical issues, make it
unlikely to be completed.
Since sentence enhancements are not randomly assigned, I rely on a quasiexperimental design-the regression discontinuity design (RDD)-to make
causal inferences about the effect of sanctions at the legal limit or an
enhanced sentence on recidivism and vehicle accidents for individuals. The
idea with the RDD is that there is a discontinuous threshold or cut-point that
determines who receives a treatment. The technique was first used in a paper
by the educational psychologists Donald Thistlethwaite and Donald
Campbell,8 4 who evaluated the effect of receiving a National Merit
Scholarship on "attitudes toward intellectualism,"85 success in obtaining
college scholarships, and future academic and career performance.8 6 Their
research design provides a clear example of how the RDD works, which will
be helpful in understanding how the technique can be used for this study. The
authors compared groups of near winners of the National Merit Scholarship,
with those who barely qualified for the scholarship.87 The scholarship, which
82.

Stephen G. West et al., Alternatives to the Randomized Controlled Trial, 98 AM. J. PuB.
1359, 1359 (2008) (describing the well-established paradigm of randomized
experiments).
83. We say "in expectation," because any one randomization can lead to imbalance on
observable or unobservable characteristics between the treatment and control groups that are
correlated with the treatment.
84. Donald L. Thistlethwaite & Donald T. Campbell, Regression-DiscontinuityAnalysis:
An Alternative to the Ex Post Facto Experiment, 51 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 309, 309-11 (1960).
85. Id. at 309.
86. Id.
87. Id.at310.
HEALTH
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in this case is the treatment, requires receiving a minimum score on the PSAT,
88
a standardized test taken by most high-school students in the United States.
In a randomized experiment, with large numbers, random assignment
establishes the expectation of equivalence between the treatment and control
group. RDD, by contrast, relies on non-random assignment, where a known
cut-off point in the assignment of the treatment creates a discontinuity in the
receipt of treatment at that threshold.8 9 In the case of the National Merit
Scholarship, the minimum required score on the PSAT would be the forcing
variable90 that would determine the receipt of the treatment (in this case, a
scholarship) that would create a discontinuity in the number of high school
students that received the scholarship.91 The key insight of Thistlethwaite and
Campbell's paper, as the economist Wilbert van der Klaauw points out, is
that one could use the group just below the cut-off (in the case the nearwinners of the scholarship) as a comparison group for those who did receive
the treatment. 92 The key assumption, which to an extent is statistically
testable, is that the group below the cut-off is a valid comparison group with
the group that receives the treatment. If those conditions are met, then the
assignment near the threshold that triggers assignment of the treatment can
be viewed as being "as-if random," thus enabling strong causal inferences to
be made about the effect of the treatment on the outcome. Thus, with a high
degree of confidence, Thistlethwaite and Campbell concluded, in comparing
near-winners to winners of the National Merit Scholarship, that the
scholarship increased the likelihood that the recipient would receive future
scholarships, but the scholarship did not affect student attitudes toward
education or career plans. 93
88.

See

NAT'L

MERIT

SCHOLARSHIP

CORP.,

OFFICIAL

STUDENT

GUIDE

TO

THE

PSAT/NMSQT 4-5 (2015) http://www.nationalmerit.org/studentguide.pdf.
89.

JOSHUA D. ANGRIST & JORN-STEFFEN PISCHKE, MOSTLY HARMLESS ECONOMETRICS

251 (2009). To be more precise, the cut-off point can either create a known cut-off point, or there
can be a known threshold that increases the probability of receiving the treatment. The latter case
is typically referred to as a fuzzy RDD, while the former is referred to as a sharp RDD.
90. Some scholars also refer to the forcing variable as the assignment variable. See, e.g.,
David S. Lee & Thomas Lemieux, Regression DiscontinuityDesigns in Economics, 48 J. ECON.
LITERATURE

281, 281 (2009).

91. For a more extensive discussion of RDD, see generally ANGRIST & PISCHKE, supra note
89; Devin Caughey & Jasjeet S. Sekhon, Elections and the Regression Discontinuity Design:
Lessons from Close U.S. House Races, 1942-2008, 19 POL. ANALYSIS 385 (2011); Guido W.
Imbens & Thomas Lemieux, Regression Discontinuity Designs: A Guide to Practice, 142 J.
ECONOMETRICS 615 (2008); Lee & Lemieux, supra note 90; Guido W. Imbens & Jeffrey M.
Wooldridge, Recent Developments in the Econometrics of Program Evaluation, 47 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 5 (2009); Wilbert van der Klaauw, Regression-DiscontinuityAnalysis: A Survey of
Recent Developments in Economics, 22 LABOUR 219 (2008).
92. van der Klaauw, supra note 91, at 220.
93. Thistlethwaite & Campbell, supra note 84, at 317.
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In the case of sentence enhancements, I take advantage of exogenous
thresholds in DWI laws to make causal inferences about their effects on
recidivism and subsequent vehicle crashes. The RDD compares defendants
at various blood alcohol content (BAC) levels (the forcing variable), which
determine if sanctions are administered at all, or if an enhancement is given.
Of particular interest is the legal limit, which starting in most states in 2002,
was a BAC level of 0.08. 9' In addition, a BAC of 0.15 triggers an increased
license suspension from 120 days to 180 days. 95 I look at the effect of the
sentence on the defendant's propensity to recidivate and have vehicle crashes
following their first offense. With large comparison groups just below and
just at or above the BAC cut-off for the legal limit or the enhanced sentence,
one can compare these groups in a similar manner to the comparison groups
in the Thistlethwaite and Campbell RDD. Since it is theoretically likely (and
statistically testable with regard to observable pre-treatment variables) that
the BAC levels in these two different groups are non-strategically chosen, the
discontinuity specification allows for the treatment assignment to be "as-if
random," as was the case with Thistlethwaite and Campbell's RDD. 96
Appendix I(D) describes the model and estimation strategy in greater detail.
Although the method received little notice when first introduced by
Thistlethwaite and Campbell in 1960, use of the technique has experienced
immense growth in the last decade starting with a series of papers that
examined the effect of financial aid given on student enrollment decisions,97
and the effect of class size on student achievement. 98 Scholars have also used
the method in a number of different domains in the study of crime. 99 To date,
94. TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS 2010, supra note 77, at 1.
95. See infratbl.1.
96. Thistlethwaite & Campbell, supra note 84, at 317.
97. Wilbert van der Klaauw, Estimating the Effect of FinancialAid Offers on College
Enrollment: A Regression-DiscontinuityApproach, 43 INT'L ECON. REV. 1249, 1249 (2002);
Wilbert van der Klaauw, A Regression-Discontinuity Evaluation of the Effect of FinancialAid
Offers on College Enrollment (C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, Working Paper 97-10,
1997), http://ideas.repec.org/p/cvs/starer/97-I0.html.
98. Joshua D. Angrist & Victor Lavy, Using Maimonides' Rule to Estimate the Effect of
Class Size on Scholastic Achievement, 114 Q.J. ECON. 533, 535-36 (1999).
99. See, e.g., Richard A. Berk & Jan de Leeuw, An Evaluation of California'sInmate
ClassificationSystem Using a Generalized Regression Discontinuity Design, 94 J. AM. STAT.
Assoc. 1045, 1045 (1999); Richard A. Berk & David Rauma, Capitalizing on Nonrandom
Assignment to Treatments: A Regression-DiscontinuityEvaluation of a Crime-ControlProgram,
78 J. AM. STAT. ASSOC. 21, 21 (1983); M. Keith Chen & Jesse M. Shapiro, Do HarsherPrison
Conditions Reduce Recidivism? A Discontinuity-Based Approach, 9 AM. L. ECON. REV. 1, 2
(2007); Lee & McCrary, supra note 25, at 1-4; Randi Pintoff, The Impact of Incarcerationon
Juvinile Crime: A Regression Discontinuity Approach 2 (Job Market Paper, 2004),
http://economics.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/Workshops-Seminars/Labor-Public/pintoff041008.pdf.
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with two exceptions, I am unaware of anyone who has used BAC levels to
examine the causal effect of sentencing enhancements on recidivism. Ian
Ayres may have been the first to publish about the possibility, in an example
°
mentioned in a tribute to law and economics scholar Thomas Ulen. 0°
Economist Benjamin Hansen recently examined the effect of drunk driving
enhancements on recidivism in Washington State using the regression
discontinuity approach.101 One particularly noteworthy experimental study is
Martin, Annan, and Forst's 1993 study, which exploits random assignment
of 383 defendants convicted of drunk driving to one "harsh" and one
"lenient" judge in Minnesota to determine whether harsher sentences have an
effect on recidivism. 10 2 The authors found no statistically significant
difference in the recidivism rates of persons sentenced by judges who tended
03
to incarcerate defendants more often from those who did so less frequently. 1
This study takes advantage of a setting where the institutional conditions
enable strong causal inferences to be made from the regression discontinuity
design. Because strategic sorting around the discontinuity can undermine the
causal inferences made about the effect of the sentence enhancement, the
paper focuses on Arkansas, a location where police, prosecutorial, and
judicial discretion is extremely limited. Specifically, in this state: (1) there is
electronic reporting of BAC results, making it difficult to under- or overreport results; (2) there is no charge bargaining or plea bargaining for DWI;
and (3) judges are not able to expunge DWI offenses for the time period of
interest. 1°4 Arkansas offers all of these conditions, and because the criminal
code prohibits the expungement of DWI and other crimes, which can threaten
a research design's external validity and interpretation of the results of the
treatment, I believe the state is a nearly ideal location to conduct this study.
With previously untapped micro-data, the research provides insight not only
into the effectiveness of various punishments, but also permits the descriptive
examination of court processes and the dynamics of prosecutorial and judicial
decision-making.

100. lan Ayres, Very Like a Law Professor:An Essay in Honor of Tom Ulen, 2011 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1767, 1774-75 (2011).
101. Benjamin Hansen, Punishmentand Deterrence:Evidencefrom Drunk Driving, 105 AM.
ECON. REV. 1581, 1581-82 (2015).

102. Susan E. Martin et. al., The Special Deterrent Effects of a Jail Sanction on First-Time
Drunk Drivers:A Quasi-ExperimentalStudy, 25 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS PREVENTION 561, 562-63
(1993).
103. Id. at 563.
104. These institutional features are discussed in greater detail infra Section V.
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B. Difference-in-DifferencesEstimation
While the RDD helps rigorously identify the causal effect of punishment
within a time period, understanding the effect of laws across time periods
requires an approach that can help account for differences related to time that
might be driving the results. In order to examine the effect of legal changes
to the drunk driving regime in Arkansas, I rely on a difference-in-differences
(DID) approach, which allows for the estimation of the causal effect of the
law on recidivism and subsequent vehicle accidents.
DID relies on an experimental framework that allows one to make causal
inferences about the effect of changes in drunk driving laws over time. 105 If
we simply compare the RDD estimate in one legal regime to the estimate in
another period, we might worry that the individuals under one legal regime
might be affected by temporal trends, or that discrete events in time unrelated
to the treatment (in this case, drunk driving sanctions at the legal limit or
enhanced sanctions implemented by a new law or an amendment to an
existing law) might affect the results. 10 6 As a result, the construction of a
comparison group that stretches across both time periods that was not
exposed to the treatment can be used to account for temporal trends in the
outcome that are not the result of being exposed to the treatment.
In the case of drunk driving sanctions, I examine three important changes
to the legal regime for drunk driving in Arkansas. These include (1) the
revocation of a restricted permit allowing DWI offenders with BACs greater
than or equal to 0.15 to drive to work, school, and for a few other purposes
in 2003; (2) the shift in control of IIDs from the courts to the Office of Driver
Control in 2005; and (3) an increase in license suspension length, the
revocation of restricted permits for all DWI offenders, and mandatory
attendance at a victim's panel in 2009.107 1 examine the effects of these
changes on recidivism and subsequent vehicle crashes before and after each
legal reform-the "first difference." In order to have a treatment and control
group spanning the entire period, I compare the group that is just at or above
the legal BAC limit with those that are just below. I make the same
comparison for those at or just above the enhanced BAC level with those that
105. For more in-depth detail on DID estimation, see WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC
155-58 (Rod Banister et al. eds., 7th ed. 2011); JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE,
ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF CROSS SECTION AND PANEL DATA (2nd ed. 2002); Alberto Abadie,
SemiparametricDifference-in-Differences Estimators, 72 REv. ECON. STUD. 1 (2005); Marianne
Bertrand et al., How Much Should We Trust Differences-in-Differences Estimates?, 119 Q. J.
ECON. 249 (2004); Guido Imbens & Jeffrey M. Wooldridge, Presentation at the National Bureau
of Economic Research Summer Institute 2007: Difference-in-Differences Estimation (July 31,
2007), http://www.nber.org/minicourse3.html.
106. Abadie, supra note 105, at 1.
107. These reforms to the drunk driving regime are discussed in detail supra Section V.
ANALYSIS
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are just below the 0.15 BAC threshold. A more formal description of the
model, with an in-depth discussion of the assumptions, is available in
Appendix I(D).
One important assumption made with the DID approach merits discussion
with respect to this particular study. The control group is assumed to have
followed a similar trend to the treatment group, except for the addition of the
treatment. What is important to note is that a similar time trend does not mean
that the mean outcome has to be the same for a given time period; rather, the
two trends follow each other, even if at different levels. To a certain extent,
this assumption is made more acceptable by examining whether there are pretreatment differences in characteristics between the treatment and control
groups. However, some unobserved policy change or other variable that
affects both groups at the time of the law's passage would undermine the
integrity of the counterfactual. Since Arkansas has a part-time legislature that
meets infrequently, analyzing all of the laws passed by each session could be
completed relatively easily. I investigated legislation that passed in the
similar session, and found no piece of contemporaneous legislation that
would likely affect the results. 108
C. Interviews andPolice Reports
In addition to the quantitative work, I conducted numerous in-depth
interviews with relevant actors in the criminal justice and political systems.
These interviews served a number of purposes. First, the interviews provided
important institutional context in order to understand aspects of the criminal
justice system in Arkansas. For example, while the legislative design limited
police, prosecutorial, and judicial discretion, knowing ways of potentially
circumventing that system was important. Second, interviews provided key
information about mechanisms that shed light on how sentencing policy
influenced reductions (or increases in recidivism).
In addition to interviews, I also obtained police reports and data from local
jurisdictions in the state. The reports gave helpful context in terms of how the
process worked for booking an adult with DWI, and also provided
information on one important aspect of police discretion: the time law
enforcement officers could give an individual between their initial arrival on
the scene and when the person takes a court-admissible alcohol test. In
addition to giving qualitative texture to the process, police records have also

108. I also include year fixed effects (dummy variables for each year), which account for the
passage of legislation that might be correlated with the treatment in a specific a year.
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been used to do out-of-sample verification of the integrity of data I have
obtained from other sources.
V.

CASE SELECTION: THE ARKANSAS STATUTORY AND ENFORCEMENT
REGIME FOR DRUNK DRIVING

Arkansas is a nearly ideal setting to conduct this analysis because of a
combination of its statutory regime, data quality and availability, and
administrative procedures. In order to isolate the causal effect of the
enhancement on recidivism, the existence of limited police, prosecutorial,
and judicial discretion enables reliable causal inferences without imposing
strong assumptions on the data.
A. PoliceDiscretion
Police discretion in the form of under- or over-reporting of BAC levels
would undermine the reliability of causal inferences made about the effect of
the sanctions, since officers would likely be inaccurately reporting on the
basis of characteristics unobservable to the researcher. In Arkansas, breath
test results are immediately and automatically reported electronically to the
State Health Department's Office of Alcohol Testing (OAT), and in most
cases, to the local police department. OAT is responsible for calibrating
breathalyzer equipment, establishing standards for and certifying acceptable
equipment, training personnel in using the equipment, and maintaining BAC
records. The records are independently maintained by the agency, and courts
frequently rely upon the records when making -sentencing decisions. OAT
also examines blood and urine tests when someone is suspected of alcohol
intoxication (DWI). Blood and urine tests are typically administered when a
driver: (1) is too intoxicated to perform a breath test; (2) is incapacitated as a
result of an accident; or (3) is involved in a serious accident where major
bodily harm or death has occurred. Blood and urine tests, whether done at
local hospitals or at a police station, are also reported to OAT when alcohol
is suspected. OAT has data on approximately 25,000 individuals per year
offered breath tests throughout the state, and some 1,500 blood and urine tests
per year. Because the paper focuses on the effect of sentencing on recidivism,
the treatment (in this case, the sanctions close to the legal limit or the sentence
enhancement) is conditioned on a potential offender being arrested for DWI.
Therefore, police discretion in terms of who gets arrested should not affect
the analysis of the causal impact of sanctions on recidivism.
While discretion in BAC reporting is unlikely to be taking place, the police
can exercise discretion in the timing of administration of the breathalyzer
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tests. Typically, upon suspicion of DWI, an officer performs field sobriety
tests on the driver upon stopping the vehicle. An officer can also administer
a portable breathalyzer test, but the results are not admissible in court. During
the time period I study in the jurisdictions from which I obtained data, officers
are required to perform two alcohol tests, which could be any combination of
a field sobriety, breathalyzer, urine or blood test. While blood tests are
typically done at local clinics, the other tests are typically performed at the
site of the stop and the police station. By statute, during the time period of
study, the lower of the two BAC results should be counted for adjudication.
In addition, I conducted interviews to determine whether this strategic
behavior takes place with respect to the timing of breath tests, and if so, how
officers selectively manipulate the timing of BAC testing. Because all test
results are reported electronically, and they are used in court proceedings, I
believe that safeguards in the form of monitoring are in place to prevent this
form of manipulation from happening.
B. ProsecutorialDiscretion
In addition to the under- or over-reporting of alcohol test results,
prosecutorial discretion could also undermine the causal inference strategy of
the research design. For instance, if prosecutors selectively and
systematically charge defendants with an offense below their BAC level in a
manner that is correlated with unobserved factors, the causal inferences made
from the quasi-experimental nature of the design are likely to be undermined.
In addition, dropped cases based on unobservable factors could undermine
the random assignment of cases in the neighborhood of the discontinuity.
In Arkansas, every DWI case where an arrest charge took place must be
prosecuted. Specifically, section 5-65-107(a) of the Arkansas DWI Omnibus
Act states that any person arrested for DWI "shall be tried on those charges
or plead to those charges, and no such charges shall be reduced or
dismissed."' 9 The constitutionality of this provision based on violation of
separation of powers and the doctrine of prosecutorial discretion emerged as
the central issue in a number of court cases. In Sparrow v. State, the court
ruled it was not unconstitutional for the Omnibus DWI Act to (1) mandate
prosecution of the arrest charge, (2) prohibit charge bargaining, and (3)
disallow plea bargains." 10 Similarly, in Southern v. State, the court held the

109. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-6 5 -10 7 (a) (2015) (originally passed in 1983).
110. 683 S.W.2d 218, 219 (Ark. .1985). Specifically, the court rejected the argument "that the
DWI law violates the separation of powers provision in the Arkansas and United States
Constitutions in that it takes away from the prosecuting attorney and the court the right to reduce
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"doctrines of prosecutorial discretion and separation of powers are [not]
violated by" this section."' The court reiterated this holding in Johnston v.
City of Fort Smith. 12 Finally, in Bigham v. State, the court held that "[i]t is
not unconstitutional for this act to authorize a police officer, rather than the
prosecuting attorney or grand jury, to file the misdemeanor charge.""''
Interviews with prosecutors, judges, court clerks, and police, along with
examination of the data in a number of jurisdictions reveal that this law is
closely followed in practice. One court clerk stated that Mothers Against
Drunk Driving (MADD) kept a close watch on the court where she works to
make sure that every case was adjudicated and no plea bargains were being
made for DWI defendants." 4 Based on interviews and analysis of the data in
seven jurisdictions, charges tend only to be amended when the court is unable
to find definitive evidence that a prior DWI took place.' Moreover,
prosecutors are permitted to drop DWI cases only in two rare instances: when
an accused offender has not been arraigned within one year of the offense, or
when identity theft has taken place. 16 By statute, the prosecutor is supposed
to drop cases after a warrant is issued and the person has not been found
within one year of the arrest date. In practice, in the jurisdictions I examined,
the court keeps these records for more than a year, and they are periodically
dropped after a few years. Though records are still kept in the court database,
no cases in the jurisdictions I examined were prosecuted if the defendant was
not found for more than one year.
C. JudicialDiscretion
Judicial discretion varies with respect to different penalties for DWI in
Arkansas. Presently, six forms of sanctions are possible for those arrested for
DWI: (1) license suspension, (2) incarceration, (3) fines, (4) safety school,
(5) rehabilitation, and (6) ignition interlock devices. Figure 2 shows the DWI
penalty regime that has been in place since 2001, much of which remains in
place from the original passage of the 1983 DWI Omnibus Act, the main
piece of legislation that governs procedural and sentencing regime for drunk
driving in Arkansas.
a charge and accept plea bargains and places that power within the hands of the policeman, who
files the charge." Id.
111. 683 S.W.2d 933, 934-35 (Ark. 1985).
112. 690 S.W.2d 358, 361 (Ark. Ct. App. 1985).
113. 743 S.W.2d 405, 406 (Ark. Ct. App. 1988).
114. Telephone Interview with unnamed court clerk, Garland Cty. Dist. Ct. (Apr. 4, 2011).
115. Id.
116. Id.; Telephone Interview with unnamed court clerk, Garland Cty. Dist. Ct. (Oct. 19,
2011).
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Table 1 shows the DWI penalty regime that was in place from 2001 until
2013. Although sentencing guidelines in Arkansas are voluntary and judges
are allowed to depart from the guidelines in "non-typical" cases without
written justification for the departure,' 1 7 in the cases I examined, I found no
evidence of a departure from the statewide voluntary sentencing guideline
regime.

117. Neal B. Kauder & Brian J. Ostrom, State Sentencing Guidelines: Profiles and
2008),
(July
CTS.
STATE
FOR
CENT.
NAT'L.
Continuum,
http://www.ncsc.org/-/media/Microsites/Files/CSI/State-SentencingGuidelines.ashx.
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Table 1: The Regulatory Regime for Drunk Driving in Arkansas
2001-2013
Sanction

2001-2003

2003-2005

2005-2009

2009-2013

BAC [0.08,
0.15):

BAC [0.08,
0.15):

Same as
2003-2005

BAC > 0.08:

120 day
license
suspension
with restricted
permit

120 day
license
suspension
with
restricted
permit

BAC > 0.15:

BAC > 0.15:

180 day
license
suspension
with restricted
permit

180 day
license
suspension
with no
restricted
permit

Interlock
under
jurisdiction of
courts

Same as
2001-2003

First-Time Offenders
License
Suspension

Interlock

180 day
license
suspension
with no
restricted
permit

Same as
2003-2005

Interlock
given to
Driver
Control

Rehabilitation

Same as
2005-2009

BAC > 0.08:
Mandatory
Attendance
at a Victims
Panel

Incarceration

1 day-I year

1 day-i year

I day-1 year

1 day-i year

Fines

$500-$5000

$500-$5000

$500-$5000

$500-$5000

Judges have greater discretion with incarceration, fines, safety school,
rehabilitation, and liDs than with license suspensions. This increased relative
discretion exists in large part because license suspensions were largely taken
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out of the hands of the judiciary, and handled by the Office of Driver Control
starting in 2005.
D. License Suspensions
License suspensions, together with incarceration and fines, have long been
the main penalties in place for drunk driving in the United States." 8 In
Arkansas, Act 1501 and Act 5601, both passed in 2001, lowered the BAC
level for a 180-day license suspension from 0.18 and above to 0.15 and
above.1 9 During this time, those with a suspended license could still obtain a
restricted permit to drive to and from home to work. However, in 2003, the
state legislature passed Act 1779, which took away the restricted permit for
first-time offenders with a BAC of 0.15 and above. 20 In 2009, the legislature
passed Act 1293, which eliminated the license suspension enhancement; all
first-time offenders, regardless of their BAC, were given a six-month license
suspension and no restricted permits could be issued. 121
The formal enhancement only exists for license suspensions for first-time
offenders. Judges have relatively limited control over license suspensions.
Once a driver is arrested for drunk driving, the Office of Driver Control issues
a temporary license to the defendant that is valid for 30 days. The defendant
then has seven days to contest the suspension. If the defendant does not win
the appeal, a license suspension goes into effect on the thirty-first day. Judges
rarely, if ever, intervene in the license suspension process. With only rare
exceptions, license suspensions are terminated only if the defendant is
determined to be not guilty by the court. Thus, judicial discretion is relatively
limited with this form of punishment. As additional court data becomes
available, I will test to see if this pattern holds up, and will investigate the
reasons for this variation both quantitatively and qualitatively.

118. See, e.g., Elder et al., supra note 75, at 362 ("For the first two thirds of the 20th century,
the traditional penalties assessed for a DWI conviction were jail, fines, and license suspension.").
119. To Amend Suspension and Revocation of Driving Privileges, sec. 1, § (a)(i), 2001 Ark.
Legis. Serv. 1501 (West).
Acts,
Ark.
2003
2716,
No.
2003,
of
1779
120. Act
http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/assembly/2003/R/Acts/Act1779.pdf.
Ark. Acts,
2009
1640,
No.
Regular Session,
1293
of the
121. Act
http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/assembly/2009/R/Acts/ActI293.pdf.
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E. Ignition Interlock Devices
As of 2011, all fifty states in the United States have IID laws in place as
part of their sanctions regime for drunk driving.122 Although a number of
studies have shown that the devices are incredibly effective, with reductions
in DWI recidivism ranging from 50 to 90 percent while IIDs are installed in
the vehicle, 123 recent survey estimates from June 2013 show only that about
300,000 to 325,000 liDs are in use, compared to an estimated 10.4 million
arrested for driving under the influence.' 24
In 2005, the Arkansas legislature removed jurisdiction over liDs from the
courts, and gave it to an administrative agency. This move led to an increase
in the number of interlock devices, and also provides an opportunity to
examine how courts versus agency administer punishment. Mark Kleiman, in
his seminal book, When Brute Force Fails,2 5 discusses the importance of
delivering punishment in a swift and certain manner. One possibility that led
to the uptake is the lack of discretion that the administrative agency had,
relative to judges, in disseminating lDs. IIDs have always been voluntary in
Arkansas, but they were made the only legal way to drive for first-time
offenders in 2009. The number of liDs surged in that year, and details of this
reform will be discussed in greater detail later in this paper.
F. Expungement
Since the passage of the Community Punishment Act ("Acts 548 and 549"
of the Arkansas Criminal Code) in 1993,126 jurisdiction over expungement in
122. NHTSA REPORT, supra note 64, at 25-32 app.B. In 2009,47 of the 50 states, including
the District of Columbia, had lID laws in place (Alabama, South Dakota, and Vermont were the
three exceptions). In 2011, Alabama became the fiftieth state to enact lID laws as part of its
sanctions regime for drunk driving. Ala. Becomes 50th State to Enact Ignition Interlock
Legislation,
12
WFSA
(June
3,
2011,
4:54
PM),
http://www.wsfa.com/Global/story.asp?S= 14837540.
123. See, e.g., NHTSA REPORT, supra note 64, at 22; Jeffrey H. Coben & Gregory L. Larkin,
Effectiveness of Ignition Interlock Devices in Reducing Drunk Driving Recidivism, 16 AM. J.
PREVENTIVE MED. 81, 81 (1999); A. Scott Tippetts & Robert B. Voas, The Effectiveness of the
West Virginia Interlock Program on Second Drunk-Driving Offenders, 14 INT'L COUNCIL ON
ALCOHOL, DRUGS & TRAFFIC SAFETY REP. 185, 189 tbl.2 (1997); L. Vzina, The Quebec Alcohol
Ignition Interlock Program:Impact on Recidivism and Crashes, 16 INT'L COUNCIL ON ALCOHOL,
DRUGS & TRAFFIC SAFETY REP. 97 (2002); Robert B. Voas & Paul R. Marques, Barriers to
Interlock Implementation, 4 TRAFFIC INJURY PREVENTION 183, 183 (2003); Charlene Willis et.
al., Alcohol IgnitionInterlock Programmesfor Reducing DrinkDriving Recidivism, 3 COCHRANE
LIBR. 4168 (2009).
124. ROTH, supra note 78, at 2 fig.1.
125. MARK A. R. KLEIMAN, WHEN BRUTE FORCE FAILS: HOW TO HAVE LESS CRIME AND
LESS PUNISHMENT 3 (2010).
126. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-93-1203 (2005).
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Arkansas has remained largely with the courts. Prior to the passage of the
Community Punishment Act, 27 the Parole Board had the ability to expunge
offenses. Under section 16-90-902 of the Arkansas Criminal Code, an
individual who has been granted an expungement is permitted to state that
128
the offense never occurred and that no record exists for the offense.
However, although as a matter of law the offense is viewed as never having
taken place, under section 16-90-901 of the same code-with only a few
exceptions-an expungement does not result in the physical destruction of
any records. 129 In practice, expungement without the destruction or deletion
of records is more akin to a case being sealed, rather than expunged in the
traditional sense. One exception where the destruction of records is permitted
is when no guilty verdict occurs. In this instance, Arkansas Criminal Code
section 16-90-901 allows for the expungement of documents such as arrest
records, orders, docket sheets, and any other case-specific documents. 310
Arkansas law prohibited expungement for DWI until July of 2011 ." In
July 2011, a law went into effect making expungement possible five years
after the DWI offense took place. Specifically, section 5-65-108(c)(1) of the
DWI Omnibus Act prohibited the expungement of records for any defendant
charged with a DWI offense.132
127. Id.
128. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-902 (2013), repealedby Act 1460 of the Regular Session, No.
1638, 2013 Ark. Acts, http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/assembly/2013/2013R/Acts/Act1460.pdf.
129. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-901 (2013), repealedby Act 1460 of the Regular Session, No.
1638, 2013 Ark. Acts, http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/assembly/2013/2013R/Acts/Actl460.pdf.
130. Id.
131. Act
626
of the Regular
Session,
No.
1608,
2011
Ark.
Acts,
http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/assembly/2011/2011 R/Acts/Act626.pdf.
132. Other crimes vary in terms of whether or not they can be expunged. Act 1035, which
went into effect in 1999, made certain drug offenses eligible for expungement, while also
prohibiting expungement for Murder 11, Manslaughter, Negligent Homicide, Sexual Abuse 1,
Battery 1, Domestic Battery I, and Simultaneous Possession of Drugs and Firearms. However, the
expungement prohibition can be time limited for some offenses. For example, domestic battery is
eligible for expungement five years after the offense took place. There are six cases where
individuals are typically eligible for expungement. These cases merit attention because the impact
of expungement on the most important pre-treatment covariate-criminal history-is important
to keep in mind when analyzing covariate balance, which is discussed in Section 50.2. These six
cases include: (1) offenders who are pardoned, except those pardoned for offenses that: (a)
involved offenses against minors; (b) resulted in death or serious injury; and (c) sex offenses.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-605 (1995), repealedbyAct 1460, H.B. 1638, 89th Gen. Assemb., Gen.
Sess. (Ark. 2013); (2) first-time offenses involving most criminal, driving (although not DWI),
and controlled substance cases where the convicted individual successfully completes all
probation terms. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-65-108 (2015); (3) minors who were pardoned for offenses
they committed when they were under 16 years old. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-601 (1995),
repealedby Act 1460 of the Regular Session, No. 1638, 2013 Ark. Acts; (4) individuals convicted
of a non-violent felony if the act took place while the person was under 18 years old. ARK. CODE
ANN. § 16-90-602 (1995), repealed by Act 1460 of the Regular Session, No. 1638, 2013 Ark.
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The expungement prohibitions feature of the Arkansas sentencing regime
not only increase the precision with which estimates of recidivism are made,
but also allows for the use of the entire sample of cases, thus increasing the
external validity of claims made about the population of interest.

G. Strategic Behavior and Other Threats
Because RDDs can be invalidated if individuals are able to precisely
manipulate the forcing variable, a discussion of potential forms of strategic
behavior by defendants is in order. Strategic sorting and manipulation around
the threshold is especially important with sentencing, since defendants at or
just above the BAC level that triggers the sanctions have strong incentives to
lower their BAC level so they can increase their chances of receiving a
reduced punishment.
Although drivers and police are likely to have a sense of the general range
of their individual BAC, cases close to the threshold triggering sanctions at
the legal limit or an enhanced penalty may have a number of factors giving
drivers some control over their BAC levels. First, drivers could carry their
own breathalyzers, since they are available to individual consumers. While
additional empirical work will be conducted to verify the extent of its
presence in the population of interest, I believe that this is unlikely to
constitute a significant percentage of drivers in the sample. Even if drivers
are carrying their own personal breathalyzers, these are very prone to
measurement error, especially within the BAC threshold ranges that I am
studying. Second, while an individual's weight is a relatively good predictor
of one's BAC, variation still exists in individual responses to alcohol. These
sources of uncertainty undermine the control that any given individual may
have over his or her precise BAC level (in this case to the hundredth of a
decimal place). Third, though a challenging process, individuals could
strategically manipulate their identity around the discontinuity. This
possibility especially exists for undocumented immigrants, where law
enforcement agencies find difficulty in maintaining consistent records.
Similarly, identity theft may also result in measurement error. Interviews with

Acts; (5) a person who (a) successfully completes probation or has an expungement-eligible
offense or (b) successfully completes a commitment to the Department of Corrections or
Department of Community Correction and who (i) has one or no felony convictions that were not
for a capital offense, first or second degree murder, first degree rape, kidnapping, aggravated
robbery, or delivery of controlled substances to a minor or who (ii) has no prior felonies. ARK.
CODE ANN. § 16-93-1207 (2015); and (6) any individual who is charged and arrested for any
criminal offense and is nolle prossed, dismissed, or acquitted. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-93-1207
(2015).
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police, judges, and city attorneys in the area confirm that this is an issue;
precise estimates are currently unknown, but the likelihood of it affecting
estimates disproportionately across the BAC threshold are very low. Finally,
most drivers are unlikely to know exactly how many drinks-to a precise
level-will move them to specific BAC levels. Appendix 1(B) shows the
number of drinks an individual would likely have to be at a certain BAC level,
given an individual's sex and weight. For most people within normal weight
ranges, one drink can result in movement across a wide range of the BAC
scale, also adding to the difficulty of precisely landing just below, or just at
or above a threshold that triggers a particular sentence.

VI.

DESCRIPTION OF DATA

Against this backdrop, I obtained data from a number of government
agencies in Arkansas. Specifically, I have alcohol testing and vehicle accident
data from OAT, court data from the Administrative Office of the Courts and
a number of local courts, and local police data.
A. Alcohol Testing Data
BAC data came from OAT in the form of individual-level reports. OAT
provided me with every blood, breath, and urine test that was given by an
official health worker or law enforcement officer in the state. All BACswhether they are blood, breath, or urine-are to the thousandth of a decimal
place. Sentencing for drunk driving is done at the hundredth of a decimal
place, where all digits in the thousandths place are rounded down (e.g. a BAC
of 0.089 is classified as 0.08).'33 The time series for analysis runs from March
6, 2001 through June 11, 2013.'14 During this period, officials administered
186,745 alcohol tests for sentencing in the state.' 35 These alcohol tests include
tests given in health clinics, hospitals, jails, morgues, and police stations. As
a consequence of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA), tests given by a private practitioner are not included. In an email
exchange, the OAT Director stated that these tests "over the past few years"
133. As a result, specifications are presented with robust standard errors. Results are also
available from the author with standard errors clustered at the hundredths of a decimal place.
134. The data set includes alcohol tests from before March 6, 2001, but the OAT Director
cautioned us against reliability of the data prior to this date, since information technology systems
and practices were not as standardized, potentially undermining the reliability of the data. These
observations are not used in the data analysis.
135. The caveat that these tests are used for sentencing is included, because the figure does
not include repeat tests, given as a result of machine malfunction or test administration
difficulties.
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constitute about 3.25 percent of the overall sample. 13 6 The tests also include
non-drivers, since passengers and pedestrians are sometimes tested, which
are excluded from the analysis.
During the study period, the state used two types of breath machines. Until
January 2009, every county used DataMaster branded machines. Starting on
January 8, 2009, OAT implemented a phased rollout of Intoximeter
breathalyzer machines; by March 25, 2011, DataMaster machines were no
longer in use. DataMaster, blood, and urine test data contain the machine
serial number; incident date; incident time; the time the observation period
began; the location of the test; the arresting authority; the name and ID
number of the operator; the subject's name; whether the subject was a driver,
passenger, or pedestrian; whether an accident, injury, or fatality took place;
testing indicators; the time the sample was taken; the test date and time; and
the BAC testing results. If more than one sample was taken, the statute states
that the sample with the lower result must be counted for sentencing.
Intoximeter reports contain the same variables, and more detailed alcohol
testing data. Appendix I (C) shows a redacted Intoximeter breath report,
along with a report from a blood test. DataMaster output comes in the same
exact form as the blood test.
In studying recidivism, constructing an accurate individual-level identifier
is important, so that the effects of sentencing can be accurately determined. I
submitted a number of Arkansas Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
requests, and eventually obtained, in addition to the individuals' names, their
birth month, birth year, state of their driver's license, and the last four digits
of their driver's license number, in order to create a person-level identifier.
When the State of Arkansas used DataMaster machines, law enforcement
officers and medical personnel entered the individual's information
manually. As a result, data entry errors are possible, which would likely result
in recidivism rates and treatment effects being understated, since the
probability of categorizing the same person as two different people is more
likely with the previously described procedures. I have no reason to believe
that data entry errors would vary across the BAC thresholds that I explore, in
large part because the person using the breath machine enters the individual's
information before knowing the arrestee's breath test result.137 Nevertheless,
136. By law, every law enforcement agency must submit samples to OAT, but in practice,
alcohol tests might occasionally be conducted by a hospital. The number of tests that fall into this
category are a small percentage of tests. Email from Laura Bailey, Chief Admin. Officer of the
Blood Alcohol Testing Program, Ark. Dep't of Health, to author (Sept. 27, 2013, 2:32 PM) (on
file with author).
137. If data entry was done after the BAC result was given, one possible explanation for
higher error rates below the legal limit might be that the person entering the information did not
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I took a number of steps to improve the accuracy of the identifier. First, I
looked for obvious reporting errors through our own inspection of the data.
Second, I used out-of-sample data from state and local courts, the Arkansas
State Police crash database, local prosecutor data, and the Office of Drive
Control to detect and correct any possible data entry errors. Third, I
constructed multiple individual-level identifiers, using permutations of the
identified information, and performed robustness checks on the results of our
data analysis. I find that the results are substantively robust, irrespective of
the identifier that is chosen.
B. Vehicle Crash andLocal Court Data
Vehicle crash data came from the OAT alcohol testing reports and the
Arkansas State Police crash database. The alcohol testing reports contain data
on whether an individual who was tested was involved in a vehicle crash, and
whether injuries or deaths resulted from the intoxication or crash.
In addition to statewide vehicle crash data, I obtained local court data from
local counties and cities. This data includes demographic data, criminal
history, sentencing reports, and court narratives of everyone at the court. In
some cases, I had direct access to the court database that helped us understand
and collect important data for this project.
C. DescriptiveStatistics
I begin by examining the frequency of BAC test results, in order to see
whether the distribution is continuous and smooth across the thresholds of
interest. OAT measures BAC to the thousandths of a decimal place (3
decimal places), and so the data reflects the true measurement of the BAC
tests. Any non-random sorting across the discontinuity can undermine the
integrity of the RDD, since randomness local to the threshold is an important
condition for making valid causal inferences about the effect of sanctions on
the outcomes of interest.
Figure 2 presents histograms that show the frequency distributions of BAC
tests during the entire time series of reliable data (March 2001 to July 2013).
Figure 2(a) shows BAC counts for a wide BAC range that includes all BAC
tests greater than 0 and less than or equal to 0.45. Figure 2(b) shows the
frequency distributions for a narrower range of BAC levels between 0.05 and
0.20, which are closer to the thresholds of the legal limit of 0.08 and the
think the test results would be as consequential, and would thus be less diligent in performing
data entry. We have no reason to believe this is the case as a consequence of the process.
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license suspension enhancement of 0.15, which are the focus of this paper. If
police officers or other actors systematically under- or over-reported BACs
at the threshold, or if individuals could systematically manipulate their BAC
levels strategically at the threshold on a large scale, a discontinuous "jump"
at 0.08 or 0.15 would be visible. The histograms provide primafacie evidence
that this type of behavior is unlikely because the frequency counts do not
have sudden changes across both thresholds.
Figure 2: Frequency Distribution of BAC (Bin Width 0.001) for
First-Time and All Offenders
Figure 2(a): Frequency Distribution for 0 < BAC < 0.45
First-Time Offenders

All Offenders
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Figure 2(b): Frequency Distribution for 0.05 < BAC < 0.20
First-Time Offenders
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D. Similarity of Groups Across BAC Thresholds

In order to make causal inferences about the effect of the sanctions being
tested, one important assumption is that the group below the threshold is a
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valid counterfactual for the group above the threshold. 3 8 To test the extent to
which this assumption might be true, I examine whether the comparison
groups just below and just at or above the threshold are similar with respect
to pre-treatment characteristics. Specifically, I examine whether the groups
at or above the BAC threshold of 0.15 are statistically indistinguishable on
pre-existing (or pre-treatment) characteristics from those who are not (in
statistical parlance, I see if the groups are balanced on pre-treatment
covariates). I also check for covariate balance at the legal limit as well.
Figure 3 presents the covariate balance results for 37 pre-treatment
variables thresholds close to the 0.08 (0.06 < BAC < 0.10) and 0.15 (0.13 <
BAC < 0.17) thresholds. The data in Figure 3 comes from Garland County,
where I obtained individual-level demographic and criminal history data
from the District Court. Demographic covariates include age, height, weight,
sex, and race. I show the results for the 32 most common offenses across
seven different categories of offenses: (1) traffic violations, (2) vehicle and
license-related infractions, (3) assault, battery, and harassment, (4) contempt
and court fee debts, (5) drugs, (6) theft, and (7) nuisance and disturbance. For
the group closest to the legal limit only one variable-not wearing a
seatbelt-shows a statistically significant difference at the 95 percent
confidence interval. The same is true for the groups at the higher BAC level,
with differences in parking meter violations also showing a difference.
Overall, the similarity of the two groups on pre-treatment characteristics
buttresses the credibility of the research design strategy resulting in unbiased
estimates of the causal effects of the drunk driving sanctions.

138. Technically, under the Neyman-Holland-Rubin causal model, the validity of a
counterfactual is unverifiable, since it is not possible to observe two outcomes at the same time
with the same groups. This issue is an important feature of the "fundamental problems of causal
inference," discussed in greater depth in Paul W. Holland, Statistics and Causal Inference, 81 J.
AM. STAT. ASS'N 945, 947 (1986). The consequence, in this experimental or quasi-experimental
framework, is that we can never directly measure the causal effect of the treatment on an outcome,
but can only make causal inferences. Thus, verifying if the groups are similar using pre-treatment
observables in the data is what can be done to make valid causal inferences about the effect of the
treatment on the outcome.
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Figure 3: Balance on Pre-Treatment Observable Characteristics
(Garland County, Arkansas)
Figure 3(a): Covariate Balance for 0.065 _< BAC < 0.94
Demographic
Age
Weight
Gender
Minorities
Race (Each Race Specified)

CASES

BELOW

ABVE

576
556
575

35.05
169.63
297

35.94
168.68
149

576
576

60
NA

30
NA

45

28

36

20

19
17
9

7
6
9

26

10

20
66

11
29

32
29

17
15

43
7
14

20
6
7

35
36

19
18

110

58

65

45

43

15

26

14

18
10

7
7

Traffic-Related
Careless Driving
Disobey Stop/Yield Line
Disobeyed Traffic Device
Driving Left of Center
Fail to Yield/Give Right of Way

Following Too Closely
Parking Meter Violation
Speeding (Speed Unspecified)
Speeding 0-10 MPHOver Limit
Speeding 11-20 MPHOver Limit

.. . .. . .

.. . . . . .. . . . .

Vehicle/License-Related
Driving w/ Susp. License

576

Driving w/ Susp. License - Prey. DWI
Expired Drivers License
Improper/Expired Tags or Reg.
No Drivers License
No Liability Insurance
No Seatbelt
No Vehicle License Plate

576
576
576
576
576
576
576

Assault/Battery/Harassment
Battery - 3rd Degree
Domestic Battery - 3rd Degree
Harassment
Terroristic Threatening
Conteupt/Fees
Contempt
Failure to Appear
Public Defender User Fee
Drugs
Posession of Controlled Substance
Theft
Shoplifting - Ist Offense
Theft of Property - Misdemeanor
Nuisance/Disturbance
Criminal Mischief - 1st Offense
Criminal Trespass
Disorderly Conduct
Public Intoxication
TOTAL

-- - -

576

16

10

80

36

82
19

35
5

15

7

13
15

10
8

9

6

15
27
71
388

5
10
45
188

--------

I

I

I

I

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

P-value

I

08

1.0
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Figure 3(b): Covariate Balance for 0.13 < BAC < 0.17
CASES

BELOW ABOVE

Denographic
Age
Weight
Gender
Minorities
Race (Each Race Specified)

209
203
209
209
209

Traffic-Related
Careless Driving
Disobey Stop/Yield Line
Disobeyed Traffic Device
Driving Left of Center
Fail to Yield/Give Right of Way
Following Too Closely
Parking Meter Violation
Speeding (Speed Unspecified)
Speeding 0-10 MPH Over Limit
Speeding 11-20 MPH Over Limit

209
209
209
209
209
209
209
209
209
209

16
6
4
5
4
10
3
17
9
4

17
1i
4
3
6
2
s
16
9
7

Vehicle/License-Related
Driving w/ Susp. License
Driving w/ Susp. License - Prey. DWI
Expired Drivers License
Improper/Expired Tags or Reg.
No Drivers License
No Liability Insurance
No Seatbelt
No Vehicle License Plate

209
209
209
209
209
209
209
209

16
1
4
12
a
33
15
14

11
4
4
9
12
33
29
0

Assault/Rattery/Harassment
Battery - 3rd Degree
Domestic Battery - 3rd Degree
Harassment
Terroristic Threatening

209
209
209
209

7
4
3
6

8
2
5
4

Contept/Fees
Contempt
Failure to Appear
Public Defender User Fee

209
209
209

24
27
5

23
25
2

Drugs
Posession of Controlled Substance

209

4

6

Theft
Shoplifting - 1st Offense
Theft of Property - Misdemeanor

209
209

4
2

a
5

Nuisance/Disturbance
Criminal Mischief - 1st Offense
Criminal Trespass
Disorderly Conduct
Public Intoxication
TOTAL

209
209
209
209
209

2
5
11
17
103

5
3
7
27
106

35.26
36.11
172.14 167.19
79
s0
16
19
NA
NA

...
.

.....

.

....-

......
............................

......

------

.

..............
.....................

.......

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

P-value

The dots show the p-values in comparing the group just below versus the group just at or
above the legal limit (in Figure 3(a)) or the enhancement level (in Figure 3(b)) on pre-

treatment characteristics. Difference-in-means is used for binary variables. The
Kalmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) Test is used for continuous variables, and Fisher's Exact Test
is used for small samples. Race is coded dichotomously (minority or non-minority) and
categorically for each racial group. A Chi-Squared Test is used for the categorical coding of

race. Below and above refer to the number of cases (in the case of dichotomous variables) or
means (in the case of continuous variables) below and at or above the BAC threshold where
a dichotomous variable is equal to one, respectively. Means are presented for continuous
variables (age and weight). The dotted line corresponds to a p-value of 0.05, and the striped
line shows a p-value of 0.10.
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The results are robust across a host of BAC ranges (bandwidths) close to
the two thresholds, with at most one to two additional covariates showing
imbalance at wider bandwidths. Because one out of every twenty tests is
likely by chance to show up statistically significant at the ninety-five percent
confidence interval, the covariate balance is strong. In comparing Garland
County's recidivism rates and demographics with data at the state level, I
have no strong a priori reason to believe that similar results will not be
obtained with state-level data.
VII.

EMPIRICAL RESULTS

This section explores the causal effect of the sanctions. There are four
important dimensions to the results. First, I examine two outcomes of interest:
recidivism and subsequent vehicle crashes. Recidivism is operationalized by
examining whether or not a first-time offender has at least one subsequent
alcohol test with a BAC level greater than or equal to 0.08. The crashes
outcome is whether or not a first-time offender gets into a subsequent vehicle
accident, irrespective of his or her BAC level. Second, I analyze whether the
sanctions have incapacitation or specific deterrence effects. Incapacitation is
measured by examining recidivism and subsequent crash rates during the
license suspension period, and the specific deterrence outcome captures the
same outcomes starting the day after the license suspension period ends. All
results in this section examine recidivism within one year. Third, I show RDD
results estimate the effectiveness of sanctions within a legal regime, and DID
results, which allow for the cross-temporal comparison of the impact of drunk
driving laws. Fourth, results are shown for three distinct periods of drunk
driving law.
The three distinct legal regimes are in place from 2001 until 2013. Their
key sources of variation is the following:
(1) From 2001 until 2005, those at or just above the legal limit received
jail time that typically lasted 6-24 hours, fines and court fees, and a license
suspension of 120 days, with a restricted permit allowing them to go to
school, work, or court. Courts controlled liDs, but their uptake was relatively
low, since those close to the legal limit received a restricted permit, and since
some judges did not use them as sanctions.
(2) In 2005, liDs, which up until then were under the jurisdiction of courts,
became part of the jurisdiction of the Office of Driver Control. As a result,
their use increased following the legal reform.
(3) In 2009, the legislature voted to have mandatory victim panels for all
who were convicted of DWI, and no restricted permits for anyone with a
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license suspension. As a result, a person convicted of DWI could only drive
legally with an IID.
This institutional background sets the backdrop to examine whether the
reforms achieved incapacitation and specific deterrence.
A. IncapacitationEffects
Do sanctions have an incapacitation effect on drunk driving offenders? I
begin by comparing recidivism rates during the license suspension period for
drivers with a BAC close to the legal limit of 0.08. Before turning to the
estimates, I provide graphical evidence of the relationship between BAC and
recidivism. Figure 4 shows mean DWI recidivism rates by BAC level for
first-time offenders while their licenses were suspended.139 Particularly
noteworthy is that the difference in recidivism rates for those just below
versus those at or just above the legal limit is most apparent during the 20092013 period. The nonparametric loess regression lines to the left and right of
the 0.08 threshold have the greatest distance from each other during this time
period, with lower recidivism rates occurring for those who were just at or
above the legal BAC limit.

139. The plots are also referred to as the conditional expectation function.
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Figure 4: DWI Recidivism by BAC During
the License Suspension Period at the Legal Limit
Recidivism by BAC Level (Incapacitation)
2001-2005 (Bin Size = 0.001)
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Recidivism by BAC Level (Incapacitation)
2001-2005 (Bin Size = 0.001)
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.09

Recidivism by BAC Level (InCapacitation)
2001-2005 (Bin Size = 0.001)
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BACLevel
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The dots show the mean recidivism rates by.BAC level for first-time offenders during the
license suspension period. The data is fitted to a loess smoother on either side of the legal
BAC limit of 0.08.
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The trends in the plots are largely borne out in the difference in means
estimates presented in Table 2. The point estimate of -0.9 percentage points,
that corresponds to the plot in Figure 4 during 2009-2013 period, has the
highest magnitude of any estimate across the three periods when using the
120-day license suspension period, and is statistically significant at
conventional levels (p = 0.04)." ° The magnitudes of the point estimates and
standard errors are slightly lower for the 120 day license suspension period
in 2001-2005 and 2005-2009 (-0.7 percentage points for both periods), and
their respective confidence intervals slightly are higher than the 2009-2013
period (p = 0.11 and p = 0.10, respectively). The magnitudes of the point
estimates are highest during the 2009-2013 period (-0.9 and -1.2 percentage
points using a 120 and 180 day recidivism window, respectively), and the
respective p values of 0.04 and 0.03 are both statistically significant at the
ninety-five percent confidence intervals. Baseline recidivism rates for the
control groups are almost equal for the 120-day and 180-day periods during
the 2009-2013 sentencing regime. I examined whether effects might be
related to the duration of the incapacitation period, independent of the
sanctions.
Table 2: The Incapacitation Effect of DWI Sanctions at the Legal Limit
on Recidivism
2009-2013
120 days

2009-2013
180 days

0.065 < BAC < 0.095
-0.009*
-0.007t
-0.007
0.005
0.004
0.004
0.04
0.10
0.11
-0.004
-0.003
-0.005

-0.012*
0.005
0.03

2001-2005
120 days
Estimate
Std. Error
p
Baseline Mean
Obs.

6750

2005-2009
120 days

7586

6255

-0.006
6042

This table presents the effect of sanctions in reducing recidivism for first-time offenders with
BAC levels close to the legal limit during the license suspension period. Estimates report the
local average treatment effect using difference in means for the 0.065-0.094 BAC
bandwidth. The baseline mean is the recidivism rate for the control group (the group just
below the legal limit of 0.08). Although the license suspension during the 2009-2013 period
140. The 2009 law legislated an increase in license suspensions from 120 to 180 days for all
first-time offenders. I thus present estimates during the 2009-2013 period for 120 and 180 days
for all specifications that examine incapacitation effects. All dot-plots show the 120 day
suspension period for the 2009-2013 period.
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is 180 days, recidivism during 120 days is also reported for comparison with the other
periods.

.p < 0.05
t0.05 <p<0.10

The effects are not as strong when examining whether sanctions have an
incapacitation effect on subsequent vehicle crashes by first-time offenders.
The plots in Figure 5 show a surprising pattern during 2001-2005. For those
sanctioned at the legal limit, while their license is suspended, the probability
of a vehicle accident increases, although the estimate is not statistically
significant at conventional levels. Based on the plots, the size of this increase
appears to diminish during the 2005-2009 period, followed during the 20092013 period by a dramatic reduction in crashes for those who are sanctioned.
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Figure 5: Subsequent Crashes by BAC During the License
Suspension Period
Crash Recidivism by BAC Level (Incapacitation)
2001-2005 (Bin Size

0.001)

M
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BAC Level

Crash Recidivism by BAC Level (Incapacitation)
2005-2009 (Bin Size = 0.001)
S

*
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Crash Recidivism by BAC Level (Incapacitation)
2009-2013 (Bin Size = 0.001)
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The dots show the mean vehicle crash recidivism rates by BAC level for first-time offenders
during the license suspension period. The data is fitted to a loess smoother on either side of
the legal BAC limit of 0.08.
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Table 3 confirms this pattern with positive point estimates of 0.3 and 0.0
percentage points for the 2001 and 2005 legal reform periods, respectively.
Although the estimates are positive, the increased crashes in the first two
periods are not statistically significant at conventional levels, and the
confidence interval for both estimates easily crosses below zero. The 20092013 period is the only period where the sanctions have an incapacitation
effect on crashes. The sanctions in place during that period had a strong
effect. The crash rate for those sanctioned was 0.5 to 0.6 percentage points
lower than those who were not sanctioned. This effect amounts to a fifty-five
percent reduction in crashes for the group just above the legal limit relative
to those just below.
Table 3: The Incapacitation Effect of DWI Sanctions at the Legal
Limit on Subsequent Vehicle Crashes
I2001-2005

2005-2009

2009-2013

2009-2013

120 days

120 days

120 days

180 days

0.065 < BAC < 0.095

Estimate
Std. Error
p
Baseline Mean
Obs.

0.003
0.002
0.27
0.001
6750

0.000
0.002
0.97
0.000
7586

-0.005*
0.002
0.02
-0.003
6255

-0.006*
0.003
0.02
-0.003
6044

This table presents the effect of sanctions in reducing subsequent vehicle crashes for firsttime offenders with BAC levels close to the legal limit during the license suspension period.

Estimates report the local average treatment effect using difference in means for the 0.0650.094 BAC bandwidth. The baseline mean is the recidivism rate for the control group (the
group just below the legal limit of 0.08). Although the license suspension during the 20092013 period is 180 days, recidivism during 120 days is also reported for comparison with the
other periods.

.p < 0.05

*0.05 <p< 0.10

Before making cross-temporal comparisons, I examine whether an
incapacitation effect also exists at the enhanced BAC level of 0.15. That
threshold triggers a license suspension increase from 120 to 180 days, and
the comparison is made for recidivism rates for the sixty-day period when the
group just below the enhancement level is able to drive without a suspended
license, while the group with BACs at or above 0.15 still had a suspended
license. Table 4 shows the difference in means in recidivism rates and crashes
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for first-time offenders close to the 0.15 BAC level. Because the state
legislature passed legislation abandoning the enhancement in 2009, time
periods are restricted to before 2009. In 2003, the state legislature took away
restricted permits for first-time offenders with BAC levels at or above 0. 15,141
42
so I include separate estimates for the 2001-2003 and 2003-2005 periods. 1
Although circumscribed to this particular context and this BAC level, the
finding contrasts with scholars who have discussed the strongly punitive
43
nature and effectiveness of license suspensions in curbing recidivism. :
Unfortunately, the relative scarcity of data precludes the possibility of doing
a well-informed analysis of the causal effect of the enhancement on
subsequent crashes, but perhaps surprisingly, we see that the license
suspension increases recidivism in the 2001-2003 period by 0.6 percentage
points.

Table 4: The Incapacitation Effect of DWI Sanctions at the
Enhancement Level on Recidivism
12001-2003
Estimate
Std. Error

p
Baseline Mean
Obs.

2003-2005

2005-2009

0.14 < BAC < 0.16
0.002
0.006t
0.004
0.004

-0.001
0.003

0.57
0.001
3107

0.78
0.000
5377

0.08
0.003
3445

This table presents difference in means results for the effect of license suspension sanctions
for first-time offenders at the 0.15 BAC threshold on recidivism. Specifications compare
recidivism rates for days 151-210 for both groups, when those just below the enhancement
level do not have an active license suspension, and those above the enhancement level do
have a suspension. During all three periods, first-time offenders with a BAC < 0.15 receive
a 120-day license suspension and a restricted permit, allowing them to drive to a few
locations, including work and school. From 2001-2003, first-time offenders with BAC >
0.15 received a 180-day license suspension and restricted permit. From 2003-2009, firsttime offenders with BAC > 0.15 could not obtain a restricted permit. Their only option to
drive legally was to have an 1ID. In 2005, the Arkansas legislature transferred jurisdiction
over IlDs from the courts to the Office of Driver Control.
141. Act 1779, H.B. 2716, 84th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2003),
http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/assembly/2003/R/Acts/Act I 779.pdf.
142. I also examine the effect of the enhancement for 180 days for both the treatment and
control groups, and find no effect of the enhancement on recidivism. Results are available from
the author.
143. See generally Nichols & Ross, supra note 69; Peck et al., supra note 69, at 57; Voas,
supra note 69.
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*p< 0.05
to.05 <p<0.1

The results thus far have focused on the effect of sanctions within a legal
regime for drunk driving. I now turn to making comparisons across different
legal regimes, examining the effect of legal reforms on incapacitation. Table
5 shows DID estimates that give the causal effect of the 2005 and 2009
reforms to the drunk driving statute on recidivism and crashes. Although the
RDD point estimates were suggestive of IDs having an effect across time
periods, the confidence interval for the DID estimates overlaps with zero for
the reforms in 2009 (p = 0.62 and p = 0.30, respectively). This result
undermines support for the hypothesis that the 2009 reforms-which
included requiring an IID to drive legally during the license suspension
period and mandatory attendance at victim panels-had an effect on reducing
recidivism relative to the 2005 period.
Table 5: The Incapacitation Effect of the 2005 and 2009 Drunk
Driving Reforms on Recidivism and Vehicle Crashes (Difference-inDifferences Results)

2005
120
days

Recidivism
2009
2009
120
180
days
days

Subsequent Crashes
2005
2009
2009
120
120
180
days
days
days

0.065 < BAC < 0.095

Estimate

-0.002

-0.003

Std.
Error
p
Obs.

0.006

0.006

0.72
13028

0.62
13115

-0.007
0.007
0.30
13118

-0.002

0.006f

0.007*

0.003

0.003

0.004

0.46
13028

0.06
13118

0.06
13102

This table presents difference-in-differences (DID) results for the incapacitation effect of the
2005 and 2009 legal reforms on recidivism and crashes. All specifications include yearcounty fixed effects using robust clustered standard errors, clustered by year and county.
Recidivism for incapacitation specifications is equal to one if a driver has a subsequent drunk
driving offense (BAC > 0.08) at any time during the license suspension period. Subsequent
crashes are equal to one if a driver was stopped for an alcohol test and had a subsequent crash
during the license suspension period. Although the license suspension during the 2009-2013
period is 180 days, recidivism during 120 days is also reported for comparison with the other
periods.
p < 0 .0 5
t0.05 <p < 0.10
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The 2009 sanctions, however, do have a positive effect on subsequent
crashes. The estimates in the fifth and sixth columns show an increase in
vehicle crashes ranging from 0.6 to 0.7 percentage points, depending on
whether one chooses 120 days or 180 days, respectively, as the duration for
a first-time offender to have a subsequent crash in the 2009 period. The result
might be suggestive of increased nervousness or something inherent to the
machine that could create a difficult situation when driving. The point
estimates are borderline statistically significant at the ninety percent and
ninety-five percent confidence levels, respectively. The result lends support
that an aspect of the reform resulted in fewer vehicle accidents. Evidence for
this mechanism is described in greater detail in Section VII(C).
B. Specific DeterrenceEffects
The results presented for specific deterrence estimate recidivism and
crashes within a year of the license suspension being lifted. I also examine
the same outcomes for a period ranging44 from one month up to three years, to
examine the robustness of the results. 1
The plots in Figure 6 show the means of one year DWI recidivism rates
for first-time offender BAC levels close to the 0.08 threshold. The presence
of a discontinuity in some cases appear easily visible, which is suggestive of
the sanctions having specific deterrence effects.

144. Results are available from the author upon request. The upper bound of three years is
chosen because of censoring of observations at the end of the data set for the 2009-2013 period.
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Figure 6: Subsequent Crashes by BAC After the License Suspension
Period at the Legal Limit (Specific Deterrence)

Recidivism by BAC Level (Specific Deterrence)
2005-2009 (Bin Size = 0.001)
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The dots show the mean one-year recidivism rates by BAC level for first-time offenders
starting the day the license suspension is lifted. The data is fitted to a loess smoother on either
side of the legal BAC limit of 0.08.
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Estimates in Table 6 are consistent with this trend in the graphical data.
All of the results, irrespective of the legal regime, show an effect on specific
deterrence ranging from 1.3 to 1.4 percentage points. This variation contrasts
with policy reforms with varied forms of incapacitation that have created
contrasting results on recidivism and vehicle crashes.
Table 6: The Specific Deterrence Effect of DWI Sanctions at the
Legal Limit on Recidivism

Estimate
Std. Error
p
Baseline Mean
Obs.

2001-2005 2005-2009
0.065 < BAC < 0.095
-0.013t
-0.013*
0.007
0.006
0.07
0.04
-0.006
-0.006
6750
7586

2009-2013
-0.014t
0.007
0.06
-0.007
6036

This table presents the specific deterrence effect of sanctions in reducing recidivism for first'time offenders with BAC levels close to the legal limit for one year after a license suspension
is lifted. Estimates report the local average treatment effect using difference in means for the
0.065-0.094 BAC bandwidth. The baseline mean is the recidivism rate for the control group
(the group just below the legal limit of 0.08).
.p < 0.05
t0.05 <p < 0. 10

Figure 7 shows the same specific deterrence effect of the sanctions, but
with the outcome of subsequent crashes. The pattern is similar to the results
for the incapacitation effect of crashes-a discontinuity is visible only in the
2009-2013 period, with subsequent crashes being lower for those who
experienced sanctions. The trend is suggestive of the 2009 reforms not only
having a greater impact on crashes, but also having a longer lasting effect
than the previous reform period.
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Figure 7: Subsequent Crashes by BAC After the License Suspension
Period at the Legal Limit (Specific Deterrence)
Crash Recidivism by BAC Level (Specific Deterrence)
2001-2005 (Bin Size = 0.001)
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The dots show the mean one-year crash recidivism rates by BAC level for first-time
offenders starting the day the license suspension is lifted. The data is fitted to a loess
smoother on either side of the legal BAC limit of 0.08.
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The estimates in Table 7 confirm the trends in the plots in Figure 7. In
examining whether there is a causal effect of the sanctions on subsequent
crashes, we only see an effect in the 2009-2013 period. Specifically, I find a
statistically significant reduction (p = 0.03) in crashes of 0.7 percentage
points. This accounts for a forty-four percent decrease in crashes for those
within the 0.065 to 0.095 BAC range.
Table 7: The Specific Deterrence Effect of DWI Sanctions at the
Legal Limit on Subsequent Crashes

12001-2005 2005-2009 2009-2013
0.065 < BAC < 0.095
-0.002
-0.004t
Estimate
0.003
0.004
Std. Error
0.41
0.38
p
-0.001
-0.002
Baseline Mean
7586
6750
Obs.

-0.007t
0.003
0.03
-0.004
6044

This table presents the specific deterrence effect of sanctions in reducing subsequent crashes
for first-time offenders with BAC levels close to the legal limit for 1 year after a license
suspension is lifted. Estimates report the local average treatment effect using difference in
means for the 0.065-0.094 BAC bandwidth. The baseline mean is the recidivism rate for the
control group (the group just below the legal limit of 0.08).
*p < 0.05

t0.05 <p<0.10

Table 8 shows the results of the effect of a two-month license suspension
enhancement on recidivism and crashes. All but one of the specifications
have confidence intervals that cross zero with p values ranging from 0.32 to
0.98. Consequently, only one of the estimates reaches the range of statistical
significance at conventional levels. The confidence intervals are not
45
significantly tight to rule out a null finding of no effect, or a "tight zero."'
The two month enhancement thus appears to be a relatively weak deterrent
for this group of first-time offenders stopped for their first offense at nearly
twice the legal limit. Other possibilities could be that the severity of other
aspects of the sanctions has reached a level where marginal differences in
severity are unlikely to have significant effects. The result raises the

145. To check that the lack of an effect for the 2001-2003 and 2003-2005 periods are not
driven by a lack of statistical power, I also run pooled results from 2001-2005 for recidivism and
crashes, and find no statistically significant effect.
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challenge of regulating "crimes of addiction" where classical models of
deterrence may not be effective in reducing recidivism.
Table 8: Incapacitation vs. Specific Deterrence of DWI Sanctions at
the Enhancement Level on Recidivism and Subsequent Vehicle Crashes

20012003

Recidivism
2003- 20052005
2009

Vehicle Crashes
20012003- 20052003
2005
2009

0.14 < BAC < 0.16

Estimate
Std. Error
p
Baseline Mean
Obs.

0.006t
0.003
0.08
0.003
3696

0.002
0.004
0.58
0.001
2731

0.000
0.002
0.93
0.000
6585

0.002
0.002
0.38
0.001
3793

0.001
0.001
0.32
0.001
2791

0.001
0.001
0.46
0.000
6761

This table presents difference in means results for the specific deterrence effect of sanctions
for first-time offenders at the 0.15 BAC threshold on recidivism. Specifications compare
recidivism rates for days 151-210 for both groups, when those just below the enhancement
level do not have an active license suspension, and those above the enhancement level do
have a suspension. During all three periods, first-time offenders with a BAC < 0.15 receive
a 120-day license suspension and a restricted permit, allowing them to drive to a few
locations, including work and school. From 2001-2003, first-time offenders with BAC >
0.15 received a 180-day license suspension and restricted permit. From 2003-2009, firsttime offenders with BAC > 0.15 could not obtain a restricted permit. Their only option to
drive legally was to have an lID. In 2005, the Arkansas legislature transferred jurisdiction
over liDs from the courts to the Office of Driver Control.
*p < 0.05
t 0 .0 5 <p< 0.10

Comparing the effects of the sanctions across the legal regimes, I find that
the DID results that provide estimates of the causal effect of the 2005 and
2009 laws by and large do not reach levels of conventional statistical
significance for any specification, irrespective of the outcome. However,
worth noting is that one point estimate from the 2001-2003 period, in
comparison with the 2003-2005 period, did have a 0.6 percentage points on
recidivism. Nevertheless, this conclusion should be taken with some
reservation.
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Table 9: The Specific Deterrence Effect of the 2005 and 2009 Drunk
Driving Reforms on Recidivism and Vehicle Crashes
(Difference-in-Differences Results)

I
Estimate
Std. Error
p
Obs.

Recidivism
2009
2005
0.14 < BAC < 0.16
0.013
0.006
0.011
0.016
0.24
0.69
10372
8231

Vehicle Crashes
2009
2005
-0.007
0.008
0.36
8231

-0.002
0.005
0.64
10372

This table presents difference-in-differences (DID) results for the specific deterrence effect
of the 2005 and 2009 legal reforms on recidivism and crashes. All specifications include
year-county fixed effects using robust clustered standard errors, clustered by year and
county. Recidivism for incapacitation specifications is equal to one if a driver has a
subsequent drunk driving offense (BAC > 0.08) at any time during the license suspension
period. Subsequent crashes are equal to one if a driver was stopped for an alcohol test and
had a subsequent crash during the license suspension period. Although the license suspension
during the 2009-2013 period is 180 days, recidivism during 120 days is also reported for
comparison with the other periods.
.p< 0 .0 5
t0. 0 5 <p<0.10

Table 10 summarizes the key results of the analysis in tabular form. A
number of findings emerge from the overall results.
First, Arkansas drunk driving sanctions-under certain conditions---can
have both specific deterrence and incapacitation effects, however because the
deterrence effect has been relatively constant over time, it might be the case
that focusing on the efficacy of incapacitation might provide a greater effect
in reducing subsequent crime and crashes.
Second, DID results, which permit the comparison of the legal regimes
across time, offer promise for the efficacy of non-carceral sanctions in terms
of reducing crashes. The non-carceral reforms implemented by the law,
which included stronger incentives to use IIDs and mandatory victims panels,
were certainly effective in reducing crashes while a first-time offender's
license suspension is in effect. Their impact on recidivism is mixed.
Additionally, the effectiveness of license suspensions is mixed. A license
suspension enhancement of sixty extra days at the 0.15 BAC threshold has
limited incapacitation or deterrent effect on recidivism or crashes. A sixtyday increase in license suspension was part of the 2009-2013 reforms.
Because I cannot cleanly isolate the effectiveness of the license suspension
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change at the legal limit, I cannot rule out that the license suspension may
have contributed to decreases in recidivism during the license suspension
period and to crash reductions in the year after the suspension.
Furthermore, recidivism reductions through incapacitation during the
2001 legal regime are likely the consequence of a reduction in the legal limit
for drunk driving, rather than the efficacy of the punishments during that
time.
Finally, the relative absence of statistically significant RDD results for
incapacitation and deterrence during the 2001 and 2005 legal regimes is
surprising. First-time DWI offenders are given at least six to twenty-four
hours ofjail, fines, and a license suspension. Their probability of reoffending
or getting into a subsequent vehicle crash is not statistically distinguishable
from the probability of those who received an alcohol test but no sanctions.
This result is suggestive of a number of possibilities, the two most likely of
which include (1) the group whose BAC was just below may have been
"scared straight" by the interaction with law enforcement and the experience
of the alcohol testing, attenuating the relative local average treatment effects
of the sanctions for the comparison group at or just above legal limit; or (2)
the inefficacy of the sanctions. Adjudicating between these two mechanisms
is an important line of inquiry to pursue in future research.
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Table 10: Summary of Results that Achieve Statistical Significance

Incapacitation (Recidivism & Crashes During License
Suspension)
2009200920052001Outcome
Specification
2013
2013
2009
2005
(180
(120
(120
(120
RDD
RDD
DID
DID

days)
No
No

Recidivism
Crashes
Recidivism
Crashes

3

days)
Yest
No
No
No

days)
Yes*
Yes"
No
Yes*

days)
Yes*
Yes*
No
Yest

Specific Deterrence (Recidivism & Crashes After License
Suspension)
2009-2013
200520012005

RDD
RDD
DID
DID

Yest
Recidivism
Yest
Crashes
Recidivism 1
Crashes

_

2009

Yes*
No
No

Yest
Yest
No

No

No

RDD indicates a regression discontinuity design specification that compares a group just
below the legal limit for drunk driving with those at or just above the threshold within one
of the three legal regimes. RDD specifications are for difference in means results. DID
indicates a difference-in-differences specification, which include year-county fixed effects
using robust clustered standard errors, clustered by year and county. Recidivism for
incapacitation specifications is equal to one if a driver has a subsequent drunk driving offense
(BAC > 0.08) at any time during the license suspension period. For incapacitation, crashes
are equal to one if a driver was stopped for an alcohol test and had a subsequent crash during
the license suspension period. Because the legislature increased the duration of the license
suspension during the 2009-2013 period to 180 days, I also include a specification of
comparable duration (120 days) with the two previous periods. Recidivism and crashes for
the specific deterrence specifications indicate whether an individual reoffended between one
day and one year after the end of the license suspension period. Shaded gray cells with "Yes"
indicate the specification had an effect at conventional levels of statistical significance (p <
0.1). All specifications are for the bandwidth where: 0.065 < BAC < 0.095. No specifications
at the enhancement level had effects at conventional levels of statistical significance.
.p < 0 .05
tO.05 <p <0.10
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C. Evidencefor a CausalMechanism
What drives these results? One of the main changes in law that took place
in 2009 occurred was the incentive to install an IlD, now required for anyone
convicted of drunk driving to drive legally. To analyze the effectiveness of
the device I turn to some descriptive evidence of the spread of IIDs in
Arkansas, in order to discuss the mechanism that could be driving the
declines in recidivism and crashes resulting from the 2009 reform. Figure 8
shows 1ID adoption in Arkansas from 2001 to 2012. The largest annual
increase in 1ID use took place between 2009 and 2010 (from 3,497 IIDs in
2009 to 5,502 in 2010), almost certainly as a consequence of the 2009
legislation that outlawed restricted permits without the devices. For the first
time, drivers just above the legal limit (with BAC levels below 0.15) had to
install the devices in order to drive legally. Unfortunately, the Office of
Driver Control would not release individual-level data on liDs that would
shed light on the mechanisms that are achieving effects on recidivism and
crashes through incapacitation, but also through deterrence.
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Figure 8: Ignition Interlock Adoption in Arkansas
2001-2012
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Note: Vertical lines show the timing of the passage of Act 1234, which the legislature
approved on March 24, 2005, and Acts 946 and 1293, which took effect on August 1, 2009,
respectively. Act 1234 amended section 5-65-118 of the Arkansas Code, and took away
jurisdiction over ignition interlock devices from the courts and gave it to The Office of Driver
Services (a division of the Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration). On August
1, 2009, Acts 946 and 1293 took away restricted permits, which gave limited privileges to
those with BAC levels above the legal limit, but below 0. 15. As a consequence, the only way
for those with a drunk driving conviction to drive legally during the suspension period was
to have an ignition interlock device.

The lack of individual-level data opens the possibility that at least three
non-mutually exclusive mechanisms may be at play. 146 First, because only
some forty percent of DWI offenders have IIDs in their car, one possibility is
that some channel related to the devices themselves or the behaviors that
frequently accompany the devices is effective in reducing recidivism and
146. As a result of lacking individual-level liD data, we are forced to make ecological
inferences about the effects of and mechanisms through which the devices may reduce recidivism
and subsequent vehicle crashes in Arkansas. The five mechanisms described are thus inclusive of
typical issues that arise with making ecological inferences.
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subsequent crashes. Some possibilities explaining how this direct mechanism
of the IID might have an effect on an individual's behavior might include: (1)
a saliencemechanism, where having the device in a visible location in the car
induces the driver to drive more carefully and avoid crashes more than he or
she might otherwise, or triggers memories which might result in safer driving
and less recidivism; (2) a signalingdevice, to law enforcement officials and
others that make detection of illegal driving simpler, ultimately leading law
enforcement to detect those driving illegally more easily; (3) a coercive
channel of the device itself, where breathalyzing into and using the IID
results in lower recidivism and safer driving, either by "scaring the person
straight," or by forcing the person to breathalyze regularly while driving, or
through some other similar means. A second possibility is that those who do
not have an I1D are driving illegally on a suspended driver's license, and are
aware of the heightened consequences not only of driving on a suspended
license, but also of driving without an 1ID. Finally, some unobservable factor
or contemporaneous changes that happened around the same time could have
driven the result. While I cannot definitively exclude this possibility, in-depth
interviews, in combination with checking the stability of observables over
time, reveal the low likelihood that these factors are at play. With the
exception of this last possibility, for the policymaker, one important
implication is that although the mechanism may not be fully understood,
increasing the use and prominence of IIDs is likely to be effective in reducing
crime and vehicle crashes.
One other noteworthy item from Figure 8 is that Arkansas also
experienced a noteworthy increase in the number of interlock devices in
2005. At that time, courts were not using the devices that very much in
sentencing, so the legislature shifted jurisdiction of IIDs to the Office of
Driver Control. We see from the results that the change itself did not result
in statistically significant reductions in recidivism and crashes in the first
three years. However, the upward trend in IIDs evident in Figure 8 may have
laid the groundwork for the 2009 legislation to be effective.
Some scholars have theorized that the best way to administer punishment
is in a manner that is swift and certain.' 4 7 These scholars have suggested that
administrative agencies are likely to be better in adjudicating and
administering punishment in this manner. Yet, at least in this specific case,
the reform alone induced by the law does not appear to be enough to have
had an effect on reducing recidivism and crashes. Only with the combination
of changing the underlying structure of behavioral incentives did the

147. KLEIMAN, supra note 125, at 91.
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administrative policy likely (although one cannot say definitively) start to
have effects in reducing recidivism and crashes.
VIII.

POLICY AND LEGAL REFORM IMPLICATIONS

A. DrunkDrivingLaw
Taken together, the results reveal a number of patterns that are suggestive
of legal and policy reform opportunities. First, IIDs are effective in reducing
vehicle accidents. However, they exert more of an "incapacitation" effect
than working through specific deterrence. IIDs provide a low-cost and
effective way to reduce recidivism and subsequent vehicle crashes. Although
the precise mechanisms through which they are achieving effects is an
important line of inquiry for future research, the implication for the
policymaker is that IIDs-whether through a direct or indirect channel-have
strong incapacitating effects in terms of recidivism and subsequent crashes
for first-time offenders. Under certain conditions, they also have some
specific deterrence effects as well.
Second, punishments at higher BAC levels in terms of enhanced license
suspensions appear not to be effective in reducing recidivism or subsequent
vehicle crashes. While I cannot precisely identify the mechanism as to why
the license suspensions may not be effective, the evidence is suggestive that
the group targeted with the enhancement (whose BAC is almost twice or
more than twice the legal limit) might reduce their subsequent offenses and
crashes with "harder" forms of non-carceral incapacitation, like IIDs.
Third, most penalties at the legal limit appear to be reducing recidivism
and subsequent crashes through a specific deterrence, rather than an
incapacitation mechanism. The strongest form of incapacitation appears to be
IIDs, and the possibility of using them more, through making them
mandatory and establishing a fund for the indigent with the fees that are paid
for them by those who are not indigent, would likely increase their
effectiveness, ultimately resulting in a benefit for society, since it would
likely result in fewer vehicle accidents. Though license suspensions are
ineffective at higher levels, low enforcement of license suspensions might be
part of the issue of their inefficacy. In addition to targeting harder sanctions
toward sub-groups with higher BACs, the possibility of increasing
randomized sobriety checks may be a way to increase their efficacy. This
policy, however, does not come without costs, since civil liberties issues are
likely to come into play.
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B. Other Crimes
Beyond drunk driving, non-carceral sanctions are playing an important
role in a number of different domains of crime. Yet, without rigorous testing,
a healthy skepticism of whether results will hold up is in order. The domain
that is likely to be closest to drunk driving (DWI) is "driving under the
influence" (in Arkansas, DUI), where the offender is found to have been on
illegal drugs while driving. The sanctioning is similar, although at least in
Arkansas, sentencing appears to have a bit more discretion. Prosecutors are
able to engage in charge bargaining, can drop charges, and judges have
discretion because the offenses are eligible for expungement.
Nevertheless, even if there is discretion, if it is well-understood, one can
do a variant of the regression discontinuity design conducted in this papera fuzzy RDD. The fuzzy RDD could be done where actors in the system
adhere to a formula for their actions, and treatment assignment has some
probability of taking place, rather than being deterministic as it is in this
paper, where the actor will receive the treatment (in this case punishment or
a harsher punishment) automatically. While I have not investigated in depth
other domains where the regression discontinuity can be deployed,
misdemeanor drug offenses more generally seem to be an area that has
somewhat formulaic sentencing and where the law creates discontinuities that
could possibly be exploited for quasi-experimental designs. Substantively,
similar issues of regulating so-called "crimes of addiction" are also an
important element of the sentencing regime, where responsiveness to
sanctions might be more difficult to obtain for those suffering from drug
addiction.
One important point is that the RDD is just one form of quasi-experimental
design that can be used for this type of analysis. Other sanctions that are likely
to have discontinuities include those mentioned on the incapacitation
continuum. Electronic monitoring and probation, in particular, seem to be
punishments that are likely to have thresholds in place that determine the time
someone is subjected to the sanction. If discontinuities do not exist, one other
possibility-which may seem far-fetched at first-is to have judges,
probation officers, and others in the criminal justice system who administer
sanctions either create discontinuities that would allow for the possibility of
testing various thresholds or randomly assign sanctions when they are at the
margin or within a range for some offenses where the authority found either
sanction to be a possibility for the offender. Courts, agencies, and other
authorities have an important legitimating function in the administration of
punishment, and there is no doubt that experimental sanctioning could
undermine that function. Nevertheless, in settings where the sanctions regime
permits options, this type of experimentation might be less problematic from
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an ethical standpoint. Finally, natural experiments offer another opportunity
to test the effects of non-carceral sanctions in a rigorous manner. Scholars
have already used the random assignment of judges to cases to examine the
punitive nature ofjudges. 48 A natural extension of this work would be to test
the extent to which different forms of non-carceral sanctioning judges are
49
using affect a range of outcomes, including recidivism.
C. Beyond CriminalLaw
The intersection of criminal law, criminal procedure, and administrative
law is an area where institutional design, administration, and procedural
concerns drive varied outcomes in sanctioning. In Sections V and VII, the
article discussed the effects of a reform designed to give an agency power
over the administration of license suspensions and IIDs. The 2005 transfer of
jurisdiction to the Office of Driver Control likely created important pathways
for the increased usage of IIDs. As a descriptive matter, the transition speaks
to important institutional design and policy implementation questions raised
by scholars such as Mark Kleiman and Jerry Mashaw in their respective path5
breaking works, When Brute Force Fails and Bureaucratic Justice. 0
Kleiman discusses how punishment is most effective when it is applied in a
swift, non-discriminatory, and severe manner, with severity being the least
important of the three. Meanwhile, Mashaw, in the context of social security
claims, analyzes the important role that courts versus agencies play in
administering sanctions. Courts in some ways can be the antithesis to
Kleiman's notion of effective punishment. They tend to be slower than
agencies, and in most cases, they have more discretion, leaving the
opportunity for greater punishment disparity to occur. While procedural
fairness concerns should not be overlooked and should be made central to
most questions of policy implementation, perhaps it is not surprising that the
agency was more effective in disseminating iIDs more evenly. However, it
148. See, e.g., Anna Aizer & Joseph J. Doyle Jr., Juvenile Incarceration,Human Capital and
Future Crime: Evidence from Randomly-Assigned Judges, 130 Q.J. ECON. 759, 759 (2015);
Donald P. Green & Daniel Winik, Using Random Judge Assignments to Estimate the Effects of
Incarcerationand Probationon Recidivism Among Drug Offenders, 48 CRIMINOLOGY 357, 357
(2010).
149. In current research I am conducting with Ryan Sakoda, we are exploiting random
assignment of judges, to examine whether judges expunge at different rates, and what the
determinants might be of their expungement practices. Conditional on there being variation in
their expungement, we can then use this variation to examine the effects of expungement on
employment and recidivism. Expungement may be conceived as the "undoing" of a sanction, and
thus, could be viewed as a form of "undoing" the severity of a sanction.
150. KLEIMAN,

supra note

125, at

122; JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE:

MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS 77 (1983).
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was not until the combination of a strong behavioral incentive-the 2009
change in law that mandated the device for all DWI offenders to drive
legally-that major reductions in recidivism and vehicle crashes started to
take place. The law spurs an important agenda about the conditions under
which punishment is effective when delegated to agencies. Although
additional testing is needed, it at least raises the possibility that other states
might consider giving jurisdiction of license suspensions and IIDs to the
agency that controls motor vehicles.
IX.

CONCLUSION

The study is part of a larger agenda oriented toward studying the
effectiveness of non-carceral sanctions and varied forms of incapacitation.
Understanding the conditions under which they are effective will shed light
on the means through which more efficient reallocation of resources can be
used for corrections policy. The sanctions also force us to rethink how we
conceptualize and measure incapacitation, offering a broader and more
continuous notion of the concept, while also allowing for reflection on what
the individual is being incapacitated from. The findings also have
implications for creating environments, when possible, to do policy
evaluation with quasi-experimental methods. This ultimately allows us to
make informed policy decisions that are of great consequence to society.
Although we are starting to experience a slow reversal of mass
incarceration trends that started in the 1970s, policy positions remain
polarized on whether the prison boom has been beneficial for society because
it helped reduce crime, or whether it laid the groundwork for higher
recidivism and the rupturing of communities. Non-carceral sanctions might
offer common ground in this debate, because the offender experiences a
sanction, and aspects of the sanctions might benefit society and also help the
defendant reintegrate with society. The first step to assessing their
effectiveness is to embark on a course of rigorous evaluation of their effects.
This article attempts to do so with the case of drunk driving, and finds varied
efficacy of different types of non-carceral sanctions. It paves the way for a
more rigorous, nuanced, and systematic approach to our criminal justice
policy that will hopefully lead to a more informed and beneficial sanctions
regime for offenders and society at large.
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I: INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT AND ADDITIONAL DATA DETAIL

A. Measurement Error
Table 11 shows the estimated BAC levels for a given weight and drink
combination. The increase in BAC across the scale for a given quantity of
alcohol, along with the measurement error of portable breathalyzers increase
the credibility of the estimates given in the study.
Table 11: Estimating Blood Alcohol Level
(Based on Weight and Sex)
Table 11(a): Males' 51

0
.043
0
.034
0
.029
0
.025
0
.022
0
.019
0
•.017

0
.087
0
.069
0
.058
0
.050
0
.043
0
.039
0
.035

0
.130
0
.103
0
.087
0
.075
0
.065
0
.058
0
.052

0
.174
0
.139
0
.116
0
.100
0
.087
0
.078
0
.070

0
.217
0
.173
0
.145
0
.108
0
.108
0
.097
0
.087

0
0
0
0
0
.261 .304 .348 .391 .435
0
0
0
0
0
.209 .242 .278 .312 .346
0
0
0
0
0
.174 .203 .232 .261 .290
0
0
0
0
0
.150 .175 .200 .225 .250
0
0
0
0
0
.130 .152 .174 .195 .217
0
0
0
0
0
.117 .136 .156 .175 .195
0
0
0
0
0
.105 .122 .139 .156 .173

ADMIN.,
SAFETY
TRAFFIC
HIGHWAY
NAT'L
of BAC,
ABCs
151. The
http://www.nhtsa.gov/links/sid/ABCsBACWeb/page2.htm (last visited Dec. 19, 2015). One drink
is roughly equivalent to one 12-ounce beer, one 4-ounce glass of wine, or 1.5 ounces of distilled
spirits. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., Alcohol Screening and BriefIntervention in the
(2002),
467
809
HS
DOT
Setting,
Medical
http://www.nhtsa.gov/people/injury/ems/Archive/alcohol-screening/PDFs/Overview.pdf.
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Table 11 (b): Females

0
0
0
.050 .101 .152
0
0
0
.040 .080 .120

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
.203 .253 .304 .355 .406 .456 .507
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
.162 .169 .244 .282 .324 .364 .404

o

o

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

.034
0
.029
0
.026
0
.022
1 0
.020

.068
0
.058
0
.050
0
.045
0
.041

.101
0
.087
0
.076
0
.068
0
.061

.135
0
.117
0
.101
0
.091
0
.082

.169
0
.146
0
.126
0
.113
0
.101

.203
0
.175
0
.152
0
.136
0
.122

.237
0
.204
0
.177
0
.159
0
.142

.271
0
.233
0
.203
0
.182
0
.162

.304
0
.262
0
.227
0
.204
0
.182

.338
0
.292
0
.253
0
.227
0
.202

Table 11 (c): Time Factor Table

Subtactrom

lood0.015

0.030

0.045 0.060

0.075

0.090

B. Descriptionof the StatisticalModels and Estimation Strategy
1.

The Regression Discontinuity Design

More formally, the effect of a treatment-in this case either sanctions at
the legal limit for drunk driving or an enhanced sentence at the higher BAC
threshold-is estimated by the following reduced form equation:
Yit = a + flFit + yTit + u i .

I am interested in two outcomes of interest: recidivism and subsequent
vehicle crashes. In the case of recidivism at the legal limit, the outcome of

interest, Y/t, is equal to one when an individual i receives at least a second
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alcohol test with a BAC result of 0.08 or higher within some time period, t.
Fit is the individual's BAC level for their first alcohol test, given at some
time, t, Tit is a binary treatment indicator, where:
Tit = 1 if Fit _ 0.08
Tit = 0 if Fit < 0.08,
and u i is a disturbance term. The parameter of substantive interest is y, the
slope of which indicates the direction and magnitude of the treatment effect,
which is the causal effect of sanctions at the legal limit on recidivism. The
model is the same for estimating vehicle crashes, except the outcome, Y/t, is
whether an individual who has had an official breath test at least once, has a
subsequent breath test and is the driver in a subsequent vehicle accident,
within some time period, t. I recently obtained the entire database of reported
vehicle crashes in Arkansas, and plan to use this data to examine crashes that
occur in the absence of an official alcohol test. The reported effects of the
sanctions on subsequent crashes are thus likely to be conservative. The
equation is also the same for the enhanced license suspension, except the
treatment indicator, Tit, is equal to 1 if Fit > 0.15, or 0 if Fit < 0.15.
In order to estimate treatment effects, I rely on three core specifications:
(1) difference-in-means; (2) local linear regression; and (3) regressions with
polynomials in order to determine the robustness of the results across these
specifications. The local linear regression is estimated with the following
equation:
Yit = a + fFit + yTit + 6FitTt + u i .
The terms are the same as the reduced form, except the equation also
includes 6 FitTit, an interaction term between Fi and the treatment indicator,
where the treatment effect is the difference in slopes of an ordinary least
squares regression of the points to the left and those to the right of the
threshold. Regressions with polynomials offer a flexible form designed to fit
the entire range of the data, in which instead of an interaction term, Ti, T
T-,5t, etc. terms are added to the specification, depending on the order of
the polynomial.1 2 Local linear and polynomial specifications all use
clustered-robust standard errors, clustered at the 0.01 BAC level, since that
is the level at which sentencing is determined. These standard errors thus
account for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. Although estimation
152. For a more extensive treatment of estimation strategies with RDD, see generally Imbens
& Lemieux, supra note 91; Lee & Lemieux, supranote 90; van der Klaauw, supra note 91.
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techniques are still an emerging area for RDD, scholars at this time largely
concur that showing the results of multiple specifications is a good practice.153
2.

Difference-in-Differences Estimation

The conventional DID estimator relies on a linear parametric model, that
typically compares changes in laws over different time periods. This model
compares RDDs in multiple time periods, and some have referred to this
design as the "difference in discontinuities" (or the "diff-in-disc") design.'4
Using the same notation as above, where in the case of recidivism at the legal
limit, the outcome of interest, Yit, is whether an individual, i, receives at least
a second alcohol test with a BAC result of 0.08 or higher within some time
period, t. Tit corresponds to the same treatment indicator as in the RDD; the
indicator is equal to 1 if BAC > 0.08, in the case of sanctions at the legal
limit, and 0 if not. For the estimation of the effect of enhancements, the term
Tit is equal to 1 if BAC > 0.15, and 0 if not. Air is a post-treatment indicator
variable equal to 1 if the offense took place under the new law or 0 if not. In
comparing the 2009 period to the 2005 period, Pit = 1 if the offense took
place on or after March 24, 2009, when the date the law took effect, and 0 if
it took place before that date. The model I estimate is the following:
Yit = a + flTit + yAit + 6TitAit + EX + ui.Yit = tU3tit + yAit

+

8ATitTit + EX + Uit

The DID estimate is given by 6, which captures the average causal effect
of the 2009 law on the outcome of interest. The matrix X includes fixed
effects for year and county, in order to account for unobserved confounders,
such as shocks unique to a particular year, the passage of legislation that
might be correlated with the treatment in a specific a year, and local-level
factors. ui is a disturbance term, and clustered robust standard errors are used
in all specifications. Standard errors are clustered at the county and year level
to capture potential autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. All specifications
are for first-time offenders, and I run the specifications at various bandwidths
in order to test the robustness of the results. Specifications are also run with
153. See, e.g., Lee & Lemieux, supranote 90, at 285-86. As Caughey & Sekhon point out, a
number of authors rely on a fourth-order (quartic) polynomial without justifying the functional
form or presenting the results of alternative specifications. See Caughey & Sekhon, supra note
91, at 388, 397. We have no compelling a priori reason to choose a particular polynomial
specification, which motivates the robustness check with varied specifications.
154. Veronica Grembi et al., Do Fiscal Rules Matter? 2 (Harvard Econ. Dep't Working
Paper, Paper No. 397, 2015), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id= 1852523.
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second-, third-, fourth-, and fifth-degree polynomials to test the robustness of
functional form. I run the same specification comparing the 2001-2005
period to the 2005-2009 period, where the local average treatment effect
measures the effect of the 2005 law change that granted jurisdiction over IIDs
to the Office of Driver Control.

APPENDIX

II: ROBUSTNESS

A. Sensitivity to Bandwidth Choice and Model Specification
In order to examine the robustness of the RDD results, the bandwidth
sensitivity plots below show the robustness of specifications to bandwidth
and model choice. The models include difference in means models run for
the key results in the paper.
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Figure 10: Bandwidth and Model Specification Sensitivity for
the Effectiveness of Sanctions on Recidivism at the
0.08 BAC Level During 2009-2013
Figure 10(a): Incapacitation and Recidivism

Figure 10(b): Incapacitation and Crashes
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Figure 10(b): Specific Deterrence and
Vehicle Crashes

Figure 10(a): Specific Deterrence and
Recidivism
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These plots show the sensitivity of estimates to bandwidth choice. The outcome is whether
a first-time offender reoffended during a 180-day license suspension between over the
important legal regimes that governed DWI in Arkansas from 2000 until the present.

